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ABSTRACT
THE OPTIMAL RISK PREMIUM OF BTL(BUILD-TRANSFER-LEASE) 
PROJECT: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
By
Soojin Park
   Korea has initiated total 435 BTL projects from 2005 to 2013, and the importance 
of BTL type PPP is still increasing. As the number of PPP projects accumulates, 
public criticism that private investors exploit too high profit from infrastructure also 
increases. From the policy point of view, it is a critical issue whether the average 
contract return is proper level in proportion to the investment risk. The objective of 
this paper is to estimate the optimal level of average risk spread for BTL projects, 
and test whether the BTL market of Korea is efficient. The study divides BTL 
investment period into construction and operation phases and applies CAPM to the 
former and Merton’s option model to the latter part to estimate the optimal level of 
risk spread. Total 426 BTL projects are stratified into four sectors (environment, 
military, education, culture) and the optimal spreads are measured in each of sectors. 
The main results show: the optimal BTL risk spreads are estimated to be between 
0.86% and 0.95% depending on the sectors, whereas the range of historical contract 
average is from 1.03% to 1.30%. The hypothesis test concludes that the average 
contract risk spread (alpha) of BTL in Korea is higher than the optimal level under 
99% of confidence level. The result may indicate BTL market of Korea is not 
efficient. Empirical analysis is additionally performed to identify what idiosyncratic 
factors influenced how much impact on the historical contract returns. The result 
provides supporting evidence of the different levels of idiosyncratic risks among 
sectors. The funding cost spread is proved to have the strongest impact on the BTL 
return, and the degree of market competition also makes considerable impact. But the 
influence of project size is small, meaning BTL investors do not require increased 
marginal return for bigger investment scale. The result also shows the gaps of 
average risk spreads among sectors are bigger when measured from regression line 
than those measured from optimal risk spreads. It may imply the investors in the 
education and culture sectors require higher excess returns than those in environment 
sector, implicitly recognizing additional idiosyncratic risks. The analysis also reveals 
that the return of BTL has some degree of rigidity against the change of market rate, 
meaning BTL investors look for a long-term return and thus, temporary decrease of 
market rate makes them require higher risk spread to achieve target return. Out of the 
above findings, several policy implications are discussed for the further improvement 
of PPP system: rigorous ex-ante project assessment, inducement of market competition, 
capable private partner selection, and optimal risk sharing.  
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I. Introduction
 
   If PPP is properly structured to let the participants pursue well designed goal, the 
efficiency of the infrastructure services will be able to be enhanced. The Improved 
efficiency of services and operations can increase the chance that those services are 
economically sustainable and provided at affordable rate. PPP allows governments to 
pass part of roles to efficient private sector partners while retaining focus on the core 
public sector responsibilities such as comprehensive planning, regulation, and 
supervision. Properly implemented, this approach can result in a lower aggregate cash 
outlay for a government with better services to tax payers than traditional 
procurement. To achieve these benefits of PPP, it is a precondition that the granted 
return to private party should be in affordable level. 
   During PPP project implementation process, most of the governments are worried 
whether the profit level of PPP contracts, granted to private investors, are properly 
determined in proportion to the level of risk that private investors shoulder. Without 
exception, the comparatively high level of user charge in PPP facility has caused a 
strong public criticism that private investors exploit too much excess return through 
monopolistic nature of infrastructure business in Korea. There may be lots of reasons 
for excess return in infrastructure business, if it exists. One of the probable candidate 
is the market inefficiency, most of which is caused by idiosyncratic factors. Numerous 
papers maintain that infrastructure markets are not efficient and thus, excess returns 
should exist. Vecchi V et al. (2013) suggested that the average of realized excess 
equity return over the estimated WACC is 9.27% in the healthcare Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) contracts of UK. The result confirms that the sponsors who joined the 
analyzed projects have extracted higher returns than their cost of capital. Regan., et 
al, (2011), Sawant (2010) maintained that infrastructure market is lowly competitive 
due to high barriers to entry. Bird et. al., (2012) examined the behavior of 
infrastructure market returns, and found infrastructure indices exhibit excess returns 
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with low level of systematic risk. Rothballer., et al. (2012) argued that the reason for 
the low systematic risk is due to the lower level of market competition in 
infrastructure industry due to the high level of fixed capital investment requirements. 
Newbery (2002); Finkenzeller et. al. (2010) argued that many infrastructure 
investments operate in oligopolistic or nearly monopolistic markets, which structure 
may explain the low systematic risk identified in infrastructure returns.
   If these study results are applicable to Korean BTL1) market, the public opinion 
that PPP investors get excess return may be true, and there may exist some policy 
improvement points in the PPP system of Korea. Accordingly, it becomes a key 
question whether inefficiency exists in the BTL market of Korea and what are the 
determining factors that cause the excess return. The purpose of this paper is to 
estimate optimal average risk spread of BTL projects and compare it with the average 
contract record to determine whether there exists inefficiency in the BTL market of 
Korea. Additionally, empirical analysis is performed to find out idiosyncratic factors 
that influenced on the contract returns. The paper concludes with summary of findings 
and policy implications for the further improvement of PPP system. 
1) BLT(Build-Lease-Transfer) contract is more common term than BTL(Build-Transfer-Lease) contract that is unique in Korea. The difference is timing of property ownership transfer. Korean government prefers to own property right of public infrastructures as soon as they are built. In return for the property ownership, the procuring authority grants a 'concession right' that designates the right of generating profit through the facility and responsibility for maintaining the property during the concession period. Private investors recognize the 'concession right' as an intangible asset in their balance sheet and amortize through concession period. 
Figure 1. The return of BTL project  
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   As is illustrated in above figure, the red line represents the optimal level of BTL 
investment return, corresponding to systematic risk of project. The total return of BTL 
is comprised of two parts: base rate (five years sovereign bond rate) and risk spread, 
which is, so called, ‘alpha’ in the Standard Concession Agreements of Korea. The 
former is determined by macro market and the latter is determined through bidding 
and negotiation as a compensation for investment risk. As a result, the optimal rate 
of alpha should reflect only systematic market risk that cannot be removed any more 
through the diversification of portfolio. Conceptually, the optimal level of risk spread 
( *) is similar to a market premium multiplied by betaα 2) in conventional CAPM 
theory if we consider the base rate as a proxy to risk free rate. In general, the 
optimal level of alpha supposed to be lower than the average alpha of historical 
contracts because the infrastructure market is known as inefficient. Some idiosyncratic 
factors may have affected to the level of alpha in contract. However, the higher level 
of contract alpha does not necessarily mean a mispricing because there should exist 
some limits in removing unsystematic risk in the real world, especially more limits 
exist in infrastructure market as is mentioned. As a result, the optimal risk spread  
( *) is the estimated risk spread just assuming systematic risk, which does not α
consider the remaining inefficiency of the real infrastructure market. But the remaining 
market inefficiency may be reflected to required rate of return.   
   If we could understand what risk factors influence on the required investment 
return of BTL and measure them in quantitative manner, it would provide a practical 
framework for pricing corresponding project risk. From the public point of view, it 
would help preventing both errors of accepting inappropriate projects or rejecting 
eligible ones, eventually resulting in optimized resource allocation and broader range 
of infrastructure investment. At the same time, private investors may be able to use 
the framework as a reference to set their target investment return pertaining to 
specific project. The Public Private Partnership Handbook of Asian Development Bank 
summarizes public sector’s motivations for involving Public Private Partnership (PPP): 
2) [E(Rm) - Rf] x β
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mobilization of private capital, tool for better efficiency, and catalyst for broader 
reform. Governments face an everlasting insufficiency in funding infrastructures 
required to support growing population and GDP. They are also challenged by 
increasing urbanization, rehabilitation of aged infrastructures, needs for expanding 
networks to new cities, and the goal of reaching under-served area. Furthermore, 
infrastructure services are often provided under operating cost level, which is covered 
only through government's budget, and thus causing an additional drain from public 
resources. Combined with limited financial capacity, this pressure drives a desire to 
mobilize private capital for infrastructure investment. If correctly structured, PPP may 
be able to mobilize previously untapped resources from local or international private 
sector. Although the efficient use of scarce public resources should be a critical 
challenge for governments, many of them fall far short of that goal. The reason is 
public sector typically has few incentives for efficiency in its organization and 
processes. Injecting a motivation into an entrenched public sector is difficult, though 
not impossible. Private sector operators, in contrast, enter into an investment or 
contracting opportunity with the clear goal of maximizing profit, which is generated 
by innovation and efficiency. 
   Although many researches have studied the taxonomy of PPP risks and their 
allocation between private investors and government from policy point of view, there 
are not many papers that researched on the optimal level of return for BTL. The 
complexity caused from mixed knowledge of construction, operation, law, and finance 
may make it hard to study PPP from a single view of academic expertise. The 
harder obstacle is an access to meaningful project data covering construction, 
operation, and concession agreement clauses. There are not even many economies that 
have meaningful number of contract record in BTL. Even though there exist several 
researches on proper PPP rate of return, most of the conventional researches are 
focused on Build-Transfer-Operation(BTO) because BTL was introduced comparatively 
late in Korea3). And further, project information is sporadically managed by each 
3) The BTO type commenced with the enaction of PPP law in 1994, and BTL was introduced in 2005 in Korea 
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department, ministry, or municipal governments. All of these factors may have 
hindered researchers from making quantitative risk analysis based on financial data of 
BTL.  
   The study begins with ‘ . Overview of BTL in Korea’, which introduces the Ⅱ
business structure and risk profile of BTL contract. It also explains the BTL market 
status in Korea. The following chapter, ‘ . Literature Review and Research Design’ Ⅲ
introduces relevant studies, new framework of this research, and the applied 
methodologies. The chapter ' . The Optimal Risk Premium for BTL projects' Ⅳ
estimates the optimal level of BTL return and tests whether the historical average 
contract return is not different from the estimated optimal level. Some idiosyncratic 
factors that may have affected on the average contract spread are further investigated 
in the following chapter ' . Idiosyncratic determinants of BTL project return'. The Ⅴ
chapter analyzes what idiosyncratic factors have how much influence on the average 
contract risk spread of BTL on top of systematic risk. On the basis of hypothesis test 
and empirical analysis, the study suggests several political implications for further 
improvement of PPP policy in chapter ' . Policy implication'. And finally, it closes Ⅵ
with the chapter ‘ . Conclusion’.  Ⅶ
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II. Overview of BTL in Korea  
    There exist various forms of PPP contracts around the world. Among them, 
leasing and concession types are popular. The Build-Transfer-Lease (BTL) contact is 
one of the representative form of leasing which is similar to the availability payment 
concept. 
(Source: PIMAC training material) 
On the basis of a concession agreement, private investor builds a facility, which 
ownership is transferred to procuring government when construction is completed. In 
return for the ownership transfer, procuring government issues a certificate that 
designates a right of receiving installment payment and responsibility of operation. 
Government's payment to private investor is comprised of pre-determined budget 
operation cost and installment payment that is a compensation for the initial capital 
cost plus profit margin. Examples of BTL type projects are school, military base, 
sewage system, museum, library, community centers. In other way round, a BTO 
• Responsible for providing public goodsGovernment
• Lack of budget, experience, efficiency 
Private Investors
• Looking for business opportunity (Profit) 
Build facilities 
SPC
Invest Dividend
Installment Payment (BTL)
Vs
Toll Fee (BTO)
BTOBuild-Transfer-Operate BTL Build-Transfer-Lease
Applicable facilities
Revenue generating facilities (road, rail, harbor,) 
Pure public goods(school, military base, sewage, museum)
Resource of money User’s pay Government’s pay
Risk taker Private Investor Government
Concession Agreement
Figure 2. PPP implementation structure
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contract gives a private concessionaire full responsibility for the delivery of services, 
including construction, operation, fee collection, and maintenance of the facility. The 
key difference from BTL is that the concessionaire collects tariff directly from users 
to fulfill its target profit, and thus a private investor bears the demand risk. So 
called, economic infrastructures that generate cash are built through BTO in Korea. 
Examples are road, train, harbor, parking lot etc. 
   'The Promotion of Private Capital into Social Overhead Capital Investment Act' 
was introduced to Korea in 1994 as a way of supplementing government finances and 
building infrastructure with private funding. On this legal basis, solicited projects for 
the construction and operation of economic infrastructures, such as road, railway, and 
port, began to proceed under the build-transfer-operation (BTO) scheme. This Act was 
later modified to become the 'Act on Private Participation in Infrastructure' in 
December 1999. The focus of the changes was to encourage PPP as a way of 
overcoming the Asian financial Crisis that had affected Korea from 1997. The Act 
adopted unsolicited projects as a new form of PPP. In January 2005, the 'Act on 
Private Participation in Infrastructure' was further amended into the 'Act on 
Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure (PPP Act)'. The eligible PPP type was 
expanded with the introduction of the build-transfer-lease (BTL) framework for social 
infrastructures such as school and military housing facility. A system of pre-project 
assessment was adopted. Based on the assessment report, the aggregate investment 
ceiling for BTL and (prospective) investment ceilings for target facilities should be 
submitted to the National Assembly with the budget for the following accounting year 
for approval. The legal system for public-private partnerships currently consists of 
PPP Act, associated Enforcement Decree, and Basic Plan. The Act has elements of 
both a general law that comprehensively prescribes typical details regarding PPP 
projects such as eligible facilities, implementation methods and procedures, 
government's support, management, oversight, and restriction measures as well as a 
special law that precedes other individual laws. In accordance with the PPP Act and 
its associated Enforcement Decree, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance drafts and 
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distributes the Basic Plan for PPP, specifying the detailed procedures and methods 
needed for PPP project execution. The Basic Plan for PPP serves as guidelines for 
PPP projects alongside the Act and Enforcement Decree. The plan prescribes 
procedures and general rules for PPP projects. 
   Ever since the PPP act was legislated, the use of PPP has increased in Korea due 
to the needs for building infrastructure to support rapid economic growth in the 
country. The mobilized private capital injection has played a crucial role for the 
equipment of backbone infrastructures by supplementing the shortfall of public funds. 
The number of projects and contract amount rose steady after the introduction of 
unsolicited projects and MRGs in 1999. The number of projects went through another 
rapid increase after the introduction of the BTL scheme in 2005. 
(Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance of Korea)
Total 651 projects with investment value of $88.53 billion were either being operated 
or signed as of December 2013 in Korea. Among which, the BTO type is applied to 
216 projects with the value of approximately $63.76 billion and the BTL type is 
applied to 435 projects, which value amounts about $24.77 billion4). 
4) Lee, H., Park, S., 2014, 'Success Stories and Lessons Learned from Public-Private Partnership Projects in Korea', KDI   
Figure 3. PPP track record of Korea 
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(Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 2014) 
If the PPP had not been introduced, the substantial investments would have not been 
able to made by the public sector alone, and the failure to implement projects 
because of this financial burden would have resulted in an equivalent loss in terms of 
economic growth and convenience of the public.
(Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance)
   The Standard Concession Agreement of Korea suggests that the contract return of 
BTL is comprised of risk spread (alpha) plus base rate, for which five years variable 
sovereign bond rate is used. The meaningful milestone that really determines the level 
of return for BTL is the risk spread (alpha) because the base rate changes. The risk 
spread (alpha), which can't be changed throughout contract period, is determined 
through bidding and negotiation. The average alpha of 462 BTL contracts from 1995 
to 2014 is 1.13%. It ranges from 0.9% to 1.3% and did not show a time-series trend 
with flat shape. Recently in 2014, it has dropped down to 1% range due to the 
depressed interest rate and hard PPP market competition in Korea. 
Category No. of Projects Percentage Total Invested Percentage
BTO 216 33% 63.76 72%
BTL 435 77% 24.77 28%
Total 651 100% 88.53 100.00%
Table 1. PPP track record in Korea
                                                                          (Units: bill USD, %)
Funding Source ’98 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11
Private  Investment (A) 0.5 1.0 0.6 1.2 1.0 1.7 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.8 3.9 2.7 2.2
Gov’t  Investment (B) 12.7 15.2 16.0 16.0 18.4 17.4 18.3 18.4 18.4 20.5 25.4 25.1 24.4
A / B (%) 3.9 6.6 3.4 7.5 5.6 9.8 16.1 15.9 17.0 18.4 15.4 11.0 9.0
Table 2. PPP investment ratio to government’s infrastructure investment 
 (Trill KRW, %)
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(Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance)
Recently, the importance of BTL type has been increasing in Korea. As the economic 
status get matured, interests in social infrastructures such as school, hospital, culture 
facilities have surged, while that for economic infrastructures such as road, train has 
been diminishing. Other developing economies will experience a similar trend as PPP 
market and economic development status get matured, resulting in more request for 
study on BTL return. As is illustrated in the above figure, the history of BTL is 
comparatively shorter than that of BTO in Korea, as a result, the study on BTL 
return is hard to find out. This study may contribute to academia with a new study 
topic and suggestion of analytical framework, and can also help both practitioners 
from public and private in determining mutually agreeable range of BTL return. 
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Figure 4. Track record of BTL in Korea
- 11 -
III. Literature Review and Research Design  
1. Literature review
   Although scarce in numbers, there are several researches that tried to estimate 
optimal level of PPP return based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). One 
of the latest work is Vecchi V et al. (2013)5). The study takes account of the 
corporate hurdle rate approach which is the dominant capital budgeting practice 
among equity investors in Private Finance Initiative (PFI). The study seeks to judge 
whether excess equity returns exist although this method, the author mentions, may 
over-estimate the appropriate risk premium in comparison with a benchmark related to 
the systematic risk associated with PFI projects. Using the 77 samples of healthcare 
PFI contracts from 1997 to 2011 in UK, the study measured Weighted Average Cost 
of Capital (WACC) of sponsors as a proxy for optimal equity IRR. The average of 
realized excess equity return over the estimated WACC is 9.27%. The result confirms 
that the sponsors who joined the analyzed projects have extracted higher returns than 
their cost of capital. The authors added the opinion that the most likely source of 
excess return is a lack of competition in the market for contracts, therefore 
eliminating complexity in procurement should be a key focus of policy. The study 
used the beta of sponsors to estimate WACC of PFI projects. However, the key 
concept of PPP is to allocate risks to the participants who can best handle, and thus 
the remaining systematic risk of private investor is decreased as much as allocated to 
public. For this reason, conceptually, the optimal return of private investor in PPP 
will be smaller than what is estimated based on the benchmarking beta of sponsors 
or similar industries. 
   Bird et al., (2012) measured a proper level of infrastructure investment return, 
using Fama-French three factor model. The study used UBS infrastructure index, 
5) Vecchi V, et al., 2013, 'Does the private sector receive an excess return from investment in health care infrastructure projects? Evidence from the UK'., Health Policy  
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which included 200 infrastructure stocks. The index comprises 40% of stocks from 
US, 40% from Europe, and remaining 20% from Asia. The study estimated beta of 
listed infrastructure and utility companies in United States from 1995 to 2009, 
resulting in 0.49. Whereas, the utility beta from all three infrastructure markets is 
estimated as 0.57. The beta of listed infrastructure and utility companies in Australia 
was estimated as 0.63, but when unlisted companies were included, the estimated beta 
dropped to 0.6. This result implies that the stock value of unlisted companies are 
comparatively stable and overall infrastructure indices exhibit excess returns with low 
levels of systematic risks.  
   There are also series of studies focused on PPP returns in Korea. Park, J., et al. 
(2006) studied a model for determining optimal risk premium for BTL project risk. 
The study assumed project return and equity ratio can be determined under several 
limits such as NPV 0, ROE ROE≥ ≥ min, and DSCR DSCR≥ min. The minimum level of 
ROE is assumed 8.0%, and that of Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) is 1.30. 
The study applied Monte Carlo Simulation algorism model with constant inputs and 
risk variables such as construction cost, operation cost, inflation rate, and risk free 
rate volatility. The estimated result of risk spread for BTL is 2.1% under 21.54% of 
equity ratio, 8.23% of ROE and 1.3X of DSCR. The Study is meaningful in that it 
suggested a quantitative tool for estimating the risk spread that make a project 
financially feasible. However, the topic of above research is a bit different from this 
study in that above research did not focused on the ‘market price’ of risk spread but 
technically ‘feasible spread’ that investors should achieve under given target of 
ROEmin and DSCRmin. And that, the major risk variables such as distribution of 
construction cost, operation cost, and interest rates are not observed data6) but 
discretionary inputs based on interview with industry experts. So, the study result and 
approach can’t be directly applied to estimating optimal market price of risk spread, 
and testing market inefficiency in BTL.  
6) It is understandable because the BTL was introduced in 2006 and thus, there was no track record for these variables. The study used 10%, 50% and 90% of distribution of volatility with 25%, 50%, and 25% of probabilities are assigned  
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   Jang, et al. (2006) also tried to estimate proper rate of return on BTL. The study 
assumed that investment risk spread of BTL can be measured by insurance premium 
plus long-term investment premium. They used a project data (Haman-Jinju link) to 
measure insurance premium, which is 0.36%. They added 0.53% of long term 
premium on top of the above insurance premium, resulting in 0.89% of risk spread 
for the sample project. The research has flaws in two points. First of all, an 
insurance premium can not reflect all business risk because there is no insurance that 
can transfer the whole business risk. If all business risk is transferred, it means 
ownership of equity is transferred. That is why there still remains dividend paid to 
equity holders after paying insurance premium. Second, the study measured insurance 
premium based on one single project, which can not be generalized.  
   Shim, et al. (2006) researched cost of equity capital for BTO in Korea based on 
the financial information of special purpose company (SPC), using CAPM. This study 
is one of the earliest pioneering studies that tried to estimate cost of capital for PPP 
project in Korea. 
   Park (2008) measured the optimal level of return for private investors of BTO 
projects in Korea and additionally surveyed the properness of risk premium. 
   Choi, et al. (2013)7) researched the required rate of return for road BTO projects 
of Korea. The paper studied optimal level of return in time series, reflecting changes 
of macro-economic factors. It suggested that average historical beta of road BTO of 
Korea is 0.89. On the basis of the beta, optimal level of after-tax nominal average 
return for BTO from 1999 to 2005 is estimated to be 13.2%, while the estimated 
average return from 2006 to 2011 is 9.47%. The study applied the weighted average 
beta of shareholders as a proxy for BTO business for the whole life-cycle investment 
including operation period. So, the study result represents the WACC of sponsors not 
specifically that of BTO business itself. 
7) Choi, J., Park, T., 2013, ‘A study in the Reasonable Rate of Return for the Korean PPI Projects: An Investigation on Transportation Projects’, The Seoul Institute   
- 14 -
   Shin (2009)8) assumed that investment return of BTO is comprised of liquidity 
premium, construction risk premium, operation risk premium, and demand forecast risk 
premium. The study also considered option values of termination clause both by 
government and private investor to estimate optimal level of investor's return. The 
estimated range of optimal BTO return is from 6.61% to 8.33%. This study is 
meaningful in that it realized diverse nature of systematic risk in PPP business. 
However, this approach can't be directly applied to the study on optimal BTL return 
because the operation risk of BTL is totally different from BTO. For example, not 
BTL investors but procuring government bears demand risk. 
   In summary, there are two main issues in applying the above approaches to the 
study on the optimal return for BTL. First of all, most of the Koran BTL projects 
are facilities that traditionally government had been operating, such as military bases, 
sewage systems, or schools. For this reason, there are few listed sponsors that had 
operated similar kinds of facilities to BTL in Korea. And thus, it is almost 
impossible to find benchmarking market beta. Some of the conventional researches on 
proper return of BTO used construction industry beta. However, the BTL in operation 
period has totally heterogeneous nature of business that is different from construction 
industry9). The second and more critical problem is the changed nature of systematic 
risk in BTL. The core concept of PPP is a proper risk allocation to the best bearable 
parties, reducing total managed risk as well as required rate of return. As a result, 
the portion of systematic risk that BTL investors shoulder should be smaller than the 
original project risk. For this reason, conceptually, the optimal BTL return of private 
investor should be smaller than what is estimated based on the benchmarking beta of 
sponsors or similar industries. Most of the conventional studies didn't consider this 
reduction of systematic risk in PPP. In summary, the corporate hurdle rate approach 
based on CAPM may be appropriate for measuring the optimal return of BTO or that 
8) Shin, S., 2009, ‘A study on the Fair Returns of Private Participants’ Investment’, Korea Journal of Construction Engineering and Management    9) Even though this is flaw, it is plausible to measure the systematic risk of BTL in construction period using proxy beta of construction sponsors 
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of BTL under construction period because most of the life-cycle risk is on the hand 
of private investor in BTO concession10), and the construction risk is fully on the 
hand of private investor even in BTL. However, above approach is probably not 
applicable to estimating BTL return, especially in operation period, because a major 
portion of systematic risk (i.e. demand risk) is allocated to public party and thus, it 
has high probability of over-estimation. 
   Bianchi J. et al. (2014)11) suggested that asset pricing models exhibited poor 
out-of-sample predictive performance when compared to simple, fixed excess return 
models for the period 1997 through 2012 in Australia. They employed the same 
approach as Simin (2008) and Giacomini (2006)12) to evaluate the predictive 
performance of asset pricing models on Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed 
infrastructure and PPP returns. The study used 16 years of monthly return data of 
ASX from 1997 to 2012. There are two main conclusions in the paper: First of all, 
9~10% of fixed excess return model showed the best predictor of infrastructure 
returns across the entire analysis period, which result is also consistent with that of 
Simin (2008) in US settings, and that of Whittaker (2013) in the Australian settings. 
Second, both the conventional asset pricing and fixed excess return models are 
generally over-estimating future two year returns, on average. The paper provides 
empirical evidence that CAPM tends to over-estimate return on PPP, and is not 
appropriate model in estimating optimal return for PPP projects, especially over a 
long term horizon. 
   The poor predictive performance of CAPM may be caused by two main reasons. 
As is discussed, considerable portion of the PPP business risk in operation is shared 
by public and thus, the nature of investor's risk is totally changed into similar form 
to bond (especially in BTL case) rather than that of stock. Second reason may come 
from the complex and mixed nature of PPP business. PPP concessions are comprised 
10) Of course, government share part of business risk in BTO, too. But the degree of allocated systematic risk to private investor is far higher than that of BTL.  11) Robert, J., Michael, E., and Timothy W., 2014, 'The predictability of Australian Listed Infrastructure and Public-Private Partnership Returns Using Asset Pricing Models.' CSIRO-Monash Superannuation Research Cluster 12) They used the Root Mean Square Forecast Error (RMSFE) as a measure of forecast accuracy  
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of planning, financing, construction and operation, all of which are totally different 
characters of businesses. For this reason, it is almost impossible to find out one 
representative benchmarking industry beta that can explain the systematic risk of the 
whole life-cycle PPP business. Moreover, the demand risk of BTL is shouldered by 
government during operation period because government pays revenue to SPC in a 
similar form to installment payment, which is totally different from the nature of 
equity investment.  
   This research suggests a new framework in estimating the optimal level of market 
return in BTL, which was not previously studied enough. As is mentioned, there are 
not many papers that researched on the optimal level of return, specifically in BTL, 
mainly due to the lack of empirical data. This research uses 426 project data that 
cover construction, operation, and financing clauses. This research also applies a 
multi-dimensional approach (instead of a single CAPM), dividing investment duration 
into construction and operation periods based on the different business natures in 
respective phases. Especially, a credit risk spread measurement approach of bond is 
applied in estimating the operation risk of BTL business. This research also tries to 
measure the optimal average BTL return at market level, not single project level, 
stratifying facility sectors. Additionally, idiosyncratic factors are analyzed to explain 
the difference between optimal returns and average contract returns. All of these 
efforts may differentiate this research from previous studies. And the result may help 
procuring government in assessing the efficacy of using the BTL in policy setting, 
and may provide private investors with a reference to proper return for BTL 
investment. 
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2. Research Design  
   There are four major business risks13) in PPP investment: construction, demand, 
operation, and long-term investment risks. The demand risk occurs from the 
uncertainty of actual demand. In general, the revenue of BTO projects depends on 
quantity of users at pre-determined price level. If the actual quantity of user is lower 
than the forecasted, the possibility of default will increase because net operation 
income may not be able to cover debt service amount. However, in BTL type 
contract, government pays pre-determined revenue to project company regardless of 
usage, and thus a project company doesn't bear demand risk. During the project 
planning phase, procuring authority decides to purchase, so called, social facilities that 
should be built regardless of demand level. In most cases, those facilities are basic 
social services that government must provide such as sewage system, school, military 
base or culture facilities. The construction risk generally has critical impact on the 
success of PPP projects because construction cost takes the biggest portion of the 
invested capital. If a cost overrun or schedule delay occurs during construction period, 
a project may even go default. Another critical risk in PPP investment is operation 
risk. From the financial point of view, the operation risk may be said as 'any 
uncertainty that can affect the net operation income ('NOI' hereafter)' during operation 
period. The degree of operation risk can be measured by deviation of realized NOI 
from the forecasted. The long-term investment risk exists in PPP because concession 
periods are usually over 20 years during which period interest rate change or liquidity 
shortfall may happen. In return for the long-term investment risk, sponsors require 
some level of term-premium. In summary, BTL investors do not bear demand risk 
but still hold construction, operation, and long-term investment risks. These BTL 
investor's risks can be divided depending on chronical sequence. In developing phase, 
a BTL investor has a similar position to construction company, but during operation 
period, it has a similar position to a bond-holder, whose cash flow is affected by the 
13) Apart from business risk, many other categories of risks such as environmental, political, reputation, force-majeure, etc. This research assumes other categories of risks are same in all projects because the research scope is limited to loccal BTL
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volatility of operation cost plus other variables. As a result, a life-cycle BTL 
investor’s position is similar to buying a long-term sovereign bond that additionally 
possesses construction and operation risk. 
It may be plausible to apply conventional approach of measuring Weighted Average 
Cost of Capital (WACC) of construction sponsors as a proxy for optimal rate of 
return in construction phase. However, as is illustrated in above figure, the business 
characteristics of BTL totally changes after the completion of development (COD). 
That’s why a new approach is applied in measuring the optimal risk premium in this 
research. 
   Several reasons may be summarized why a new approach should have been 
considered instead of the conventional WACC to estimate the optimal return in 
operation phase. The first reason is the mixed nature of PPP business as is discussed 
in above paragraph. Most of the BTL concessions include planning, financing, 
construction and operation, all of which have totally different business characters and 
they changes in chronicle sequence. It is hard to find out one benchmarking beta that 
covers all range of business characters through the whole BTL life-cycle. Second, 
most of the BTL projects are procuring and managing facilities that traditionally 
Figure 5. Risk profile of BTL investment  
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government operated such as military bases, sewage systems, or schools. For this 
reason, there are few listed private companies that had operated similar sorts of BTL 
facilities in Korea. And thus, it is almost impossible to find benchmarking market 
beta for operation phase of BTL. Third, the most critical reason is the changed nature 
of systematic risk in operation period. The core concept of PPP is a proper risk 
allocation to the best bearable parties, and by doing so, reduction of total risk as 
well as required rate of return. For example, the demand risk of BTL is shouldered 
by government during the operation period because government pays revenue to SPC 
in a similar form to installment payment, which is totally different from the nature of 
equity investment. As a result, the remaining systematic risk of BTL investors should 
be smaller than the original level of business risk, especially in operation phase14). 
For this reason, it is a matter of course that the optimal BTL return of private 
investor should be smaller than what is estimated based on a benchmarking beta of 
sponsors or similar industry and so, separate methodology should be applied for the 
operation phase. As is introduced, the study of Bianchi J. et al. (2014) supports this 
argument with empirical evidence that CAPM tends to over-estimate return on PPP, 
and is not appropriate model in estimating optimal return for PPP projects, especially 
over a long term horizon. They concluded that fixed excess return models predict 
PPP performance better than asset pricing models.  
   The chapter ' . Optimal risk premium for BTL projects' investigates the optimal Ⅳ
level of BTL return (r*t) and test whether the contract average is not different from 
the estimated level. As is discussed, the investment life-cycle of BTL may be divided 
into construction and operation periods. We estimate the optimal return of SPC 
(Special Purpose Company) by weighted average returns of the two periods (r*c,t, 
r*o,t), additionally considering a long-term investment premium. 
   ∙   ∙                       (3.1)
14) In general, most of construction risk is allocated to private partner whereas, demand and termination risks are allocated to public partner in operation phase, resulting in reduced level of investment risk for private partner. 
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r*t  : optimal return from a BTL project, assessed at time 't' (beginning of project) 
r*c,t : optimal rate of return for construction period, assessed at time 't' 
r*o,t : optimal rate of rerun for operation period, assessed at time 't' 
ϴ  : share of return for construction period in total (refer to appendix 8) 
   The optimal in construction period (r*c,t) is measured by the weighted average cost 
of capital (WACC)15) based on the average equity share in total asset (K) of BTL 
project companies, average cost of debt (kd), and estimated cost of equity capital 
E(ke). For this purpose, the average benchmarking beta of construction sponsors that 
historically joined BTL is calculated. The beta is revised reflecting the leverage ratio 
of BTL projects, using Hamada model. The revised beta is applied to CAPM to draw 
the estimated cost of equity capital E(ke).  
               ∙    ∙           (3.2) 
                                                            
 ke   : cost of equity capital (estimated based on CAPM) 
 kd   : cost of debt capital (historical average of BTL contracts)  
 τ    : corporate tax rate (effective marginal corporate tax rate) 
 K   : equity share in total asset (historical average of BTL contracts)
 Et[·] : expectation operator, assessed at time 't' based on a best possible information set
 rs*o,t : optimal risk spread in operation period  
 Rf   : risk free rate 
   The BTL investor's payoff position during operation period is similar to investing 
in a risky bond, which value mainly depends on the volatility of operation cost. And 
the volatility comes from the deviation of actual cost from the contracted budget cost 
of SPC. The risk spread during operation period (rs*o,t) is measured based on the 
Merton's option model16). And the optimal rate of return in operation period (r*o,t) is 
15) The long-term investment premium is added on top of estimated WACC considering the investment duration of BTL  16) The Merton's option model is one of the 'distance-to-default theory' that requires only distribution of asset value volatility and leverage ratio information for credit risk measurement, while other theories need large population of empirical default rate data. And, the Merton's model can describe the isomorphic pay-off position of BTL's installment payments in the most 
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calculated by adding a risk free rate (Rf) to the above calculated optimal risk spread 
for operation period.17) 
   The optimal BTL return (r*t) minus risk free rate (Rf) makes the optimal risk 
spread of BTL ( *α ), which can be fairly compared with historical average contract 
risk spread (αcontract)18). It can be tested whether, in overall, the average contract BTL 
spread of Korea is not different from the optimal level. In other words, it can be 
tested whether the inefficiency in BTL market of Korea exist. 
   The null hypothesis is        , and the alternative one is 
     ≠  . The null hypothesis means 'the historical average of BTL 
contract spread (alpha) is statistically not different from the optimal risk spread in 
Korea'. If the null hypothesis is accepted, we will conclude there is no evidence that 
BTL market of Korea is inefficient. And the alternative hypothesis means 'there is no 
evidence that the historical average of BTL contract spread (alpha) is statistically not 
different from the optimal risk spread in Korea'. If the alternative hypothesis is 
accepted, we may conclude that there exists inefficiency in BTL market of Korea. 
The optimal risk spread of BTL ( *α ) is the ‘estimated’ spread, which by nature, may 
have some degree of measurement error. The statistical confidence interval of 99% is 
considered in the hypothesis test. 
   If the alternative hypothesis is accepted, it can be said that the BTL market of 
Korea is not fully efficient, and idiosyncratic factors are reflected to the contract 
returns. These factors are investigated in the following chapter ' . Idiosyncratic Ⅴ
determinants on BTL return' to draw political implications. The chapter analyzes what 
idiosyncratic factors have how much influence on the average contract risk spread of 
BTL on top of the systematic risk. The historical BTL contract returns are regressed 
on factors such as project size, number of bidders, facility sectors, etc. 
similar way. 17) The long-term investment premium is added on top of the estimated optimal return in operation period considering the investment duration of BTL 18) The total returns can't be compared because the base rate changes depending on macro market 
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Macroeconomic variables such as risk-free rate, and market risk spread are regressed 
together for control purpose. Also, dummy variables are assigned to stratify facility 
sectors. On the basis of hypothesis test as well as empirical analysis, the paper 
suggests political implication for further improvement of PPP policy in chapter ' . Ⅵ
Policy implication'. 
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IV. The optimal risk premium for BTL projects 
1. The optimal return in construction period (r*c,t) 
   PPP projects are implemented through SPC (Special Purpose Company), which are 
generally not listed in Korea and so, hard to get market beta or ROE (return on 
equity) data. Especially during the construction period, SPC doesn't even generate 
cash, making it hard to directly measure systematic business risk. So, the optimal rate 
of return during construction period can't be directly measured by observing operation 
risk of SPC. As a result, an indirect approach is needed to measure the optimal 
return of BTL projects during the construction period. The premise used in this paper 
is that the optimal rate of return during construction period (r*c,t) can be measured 
using the WACC of SPC, and the return on equity (ROE) of SPC can be estimated 
by benchmarking the construction sponsor's required rate of return. The estimated 
WACC as a proxy for optimal return of BTL project may be subject to 
underestimation because real market is not efficient enough. However, as the purpose 
of this paper is to measure 'optimal' return, so market noise will not be considered.19) 
   If a company is rational, it will invest from the best opportunity and choose the 
next best and so on, until the marginal ROI (return on investment) from the new 
investment equals to the marginal WACC (Weighted Average Cost of Capital). 
Assuming a market is efficient, this decision will be made by all market players and 
thus, the supply of infrastructure will continue until there remains no excess margin. 
As a result, the weighted average cost of capital shall be equal to the return on 
investment at the equilibrium point in efficient market. 
19) The effect of idiosyncratic factors will be additionally discussed in the following chapter.  
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   Vecchi V, et al. (2013) discussed the rationale of using sponsor's cost of capital 
as a benchmark to required rate of equity return for SPC in detail: "Our premise is 
that, in a non-recourse project financing, the lowest acceptable blended equity IRR on 
sponsors’ investment is the sponsors’ WACC. Given the relatively low level of 
systematic risk to which equity returns are exposed (and thus the relatively low beta), 
the WACC of each sponsor must determine the IRR in a competitive market. It 
follows that the calculation of the 'fair' equity IRR of a PFI project is based on the 
calculation of the WACC of each sponsor." This approach is applaudable for 
measuring construction risk and thus, will be applied in measuring optimal return for 
BTL projects during construction period. In order for a project to provide an equity 
return above sponsor’s cost of capital, the project IRR must be higher than the 
weighted average cost of capital of the SPC. The SPC’s WACC is, in turn, a 
function of the cost of the sources of funds used by the SPC: namely, the cost of 
debt and the cost of equity. Although various kinds of shareholders join BTL project, 
the construction risk is almost on the shoulder of construction shareholders by 
contract. Which means the construction risk of BTL project is passed over to 
construction sponsors. And that, construction sponsors are the best 'comparable 
industry' in measuring the systematic risk of SPC during construction period because 
the main business of SPC during construction period is exactly that of construction 
sponsors’. As a result, we may be able to estimate the SPC's required rate of return 
B/S (SPC)
Return on investment(ROI) Asset (A)
Debt (D) Cost of debt(Kd) Weighted average cost of capital (WACC)Equity (E) Cost of equity (Ke)
  (Source: Comprehensive PPP evaluation, 2013, Ministry of Strategy and Finance)
Figure 6. Relationship between ROI and WACC measurement 
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in construction period by measuring that of equity holders responsible for 
construction.  
   As is mentioned, the optimal return during the construction period (r*c,t) will be 
measured by WACC of SPC plus long-term investment premium. The total investment 
of SPC is comprised of debt and equity and so, the WACC can be estimated by 
averaging cost of capital based on equity and debt share ratio as below: 
      ∙    ∙                  (4.1) 
ke   : cost of equity capital (estimated based on CAPM) 
kd   : cost of debt capital (observed from historical average of BTL contracts)  
τ    : corporate tax rate 
K   : equity share in total asset (observed from historical average of BTL contracts)
Et[·] : expectation operator, assessed at time 't' based on a best possible information set 
   As most of the shareholders who joined BTL projects in Korea are not listed 
corporations they don't provide necessary market data to apply revised CAPM such as 
Fama-French three factor model. The conventional Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) of Sharpe, Lintner and Mossin is used to estimate Et[ke]. The CAPM states 
that the cost of equity capital is the sum of risk free rate and a risk premium for 
the systematic risk of asset. The model can be expressed in slightly revised form in 
the context of measuring optimal average return of BTL during construction period as 
follows:    
       ×                         (4.2)
 
Rf  : risk free rate (a return on zero variance asset)
Rm : return on market portfolio 
aβ  : the average of relative risk in assets to market return during construction period 
   Determining beta (βa) will be the hardest part in measuring Et[ke]. As the goal of 
this paper is to investigates the average optimal return of BTL projects, we need to 
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know the average beta (βa) of all BTL SPCs instead of a beta (βi) of one specific 
project. So we would like to constitute an average beta with all construction sponsors 
that have joined BTL projects in Korea. It's similar to forming a big portfolio by 
pooling all BTL projects and calculating an average beta (βa) of BTL projects during 
construction period using proxy beta of construction sponsors. In most of cases, 
construction companies join BTL as both an equity investors and EPC (Engineering 
Procurement and Construction) contractors, responsible for completion of construction. 
And, as is mentioned, the nature of BTL business during construction period is 
similar to that of construction sponsors. As a result, average systematic risk (βa) of 
construction shareholders that have joined BTL projects will most likely to represent 
the average beta of all BTL projects20). 
   Conceptually, the easiest way is to collect all betas of construction companies that 
have joined BTL projects and simply average them. However, regret to say, most of 
the construction sponsors of BTL projects are middle or small sized, unlisted 
companies that don't have market beta ( ). So we have no choice but to calculate β
beta of construction sponsors based on financial statements. Lot's of theories were 
developed in estimating accounting beta, which is based on financial statements and 
macro-market data.21) 22) 
   As Botherson et. al. (2013)23) stated, the forward-looking betas are unobservable, 
so practitioners are forced to rely on proxies of various kinds. Often times, beta are 
derived from historical data. The usual methodology is to estimate beta as the 
correlation coefficient of market returns. As such, we collected the return of 
construction sponsors during a set of time period (t) and regressed them on market 
return in a pooled manner: 
×     ∙                          (4.3)
20) When calculating pooled average beta of construction shareholders, redundant companies are treated as one. 21) Toms, S., 2012, 'Accounting based risk measurement: An alternative to CAPM derived discount factors' 22) Brearley. R. Myers. S. and Allen. F, 2006, ‘Principles of Corporate Finance’ 23) W. Todd Brotherson, Keneth M. Eades, Robert S. Harris, and Robert C. Higgins, 2013 'Best Practices in Estimating the Cost of Capital: An Update., Journal of Applied Finance  
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  R(ixt)t = set of returns on construction sponsor's stock 'i' in time period 't' 
  Rmt  = return on market portfolio in period 't' 
  αa   = correlation coefficient of constant   
  βa  = average beta of construction sponsors who joined BTL  
   From the total 426 contracted BTL projects, 458 construction equity holders are 
extracted24). Based on financial statements of 458 construction firms, the time-series 
return on equity (Rit) from 2000 to 2015 (15 years) are calculated. The 31 firms that 
showed exceptionally high or low average returns are deleted as outlier. (Please refer 
to the appendix 1). In the above formula, 'i' represents 427 construction sponsors and 
't' represents 15 years of time period. Brotherson(2013) maintained that "increasing the 
number of time period used in the beta estimation may improve the statistical 
reliability of the estimate but risks including stale, irrelevant information. Similarly, 
shortening the observation period from monthly to weekly, or even daily, increases 
the size of the sample but may yield observations that are not normally distributed 
and may introduce unwanted random noise." Most of the construction sponsors being 
unlisted companies, the financial statements are announced yearly basis. And the 
observation time slot is 15 years, generating 15 ROEs for each company. By pooling 
the 427 construction sponsors each of which has 15 years of ROEs25), we can get 
total 6,042 number of ROEs. The pooled ROEs are expressed as a set of returns on 
stocks 'i' in time period 't' in above formula (R(ixt)t). The average of pooled 6,042 
number of estimated ROEs is 10.19%. 
   Theories say Rm is the return on 'market portfolio', which is not observable 
portfolio and consisted of all risky assets in proportion to their importance in world 
wealth. In practice, a variety of stock market index are used as a proxy for market 
portfolio. However, as the above beta are estimated based on the accounting data in 
this paper, we estimate Rm in a consistent way, using financial data: The weighted 
24) Source: internal database of PIMAC and Ministry of Strategy and Finance   25) Some companies do not have 15 years of business operations, so the number of ROEs that used is 6,042 instead of 6,405 
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average returns on equity (ROE) of over 21,200 companies that reported financial 
statements are calculated from 2000 to 2014 (See appendix 4). The 15 years' average 
of estimated market return (Rmt) is 7.87%, which is 2.32% lower than that of 
construction sponsors. The construction industry is known to have higher risk than 
market average. 
   The pooled set of returns (R(ixt)t) are regressed on market returns (Rmt) to get the 
average beta of construction sponsors that joined BTL. Additionally, three dummy 
variables that stratify projects into four sectors are included to see how much 
systematic differences exist among facility sectors. Environmental facility sector being 
the base case, the 'mil' represents for military, 'edu' for education, and 'cult' for 
culture facilities.    
 Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
   We got a pretty robust correlation coefficient for Rmt, which value is about 1.143 
and reliable under 99% of confidence level. It means the average beta of construction 
sponsors that joined BTL is estimated as 1.143. All of the dummy variables didn't 
 (1) (2)
VARIABLES R(ixt)t R(ixt)t
   
Rmt 1.144*** 1.143***
 (0.156) (0.156)
mil  0.0190
  (0.0282)
edu  -0.0156
  (0.0134)
cult  0.00438
  (0.0138)
Constant 0.0116 0.0142
 (0.0158) (0.0170)
   
Observations 6,042 6,042
R-squared 0.005 0.006
Table 3. Estimated average beta of construction sponsors  
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show any significant coefficient. So, the return of construction sponsors in different 
facility sectors didn't have significant difference against the change of market return, 
assuming other conditions being equal. This result means there doesn't exist the level 
of difference in constant, not the difference of slope (estimated beta). 
   However, what we are more interested is the difference of beta among facility 
sectors. It is possible that the systematic risk of construction sponsors may be 
different among facility types. To check this possibility, the similar process is 
performed again by separate facility sector basis. Instead of pooling all BTL 
construction sponsors into one portfolio, we classified the construction sponsors into 
four categories and regressed the pooled return of each sector's construction sponsors 
on market return four times, in separate. 
    
×     ∙                       (4.4)
R(g)(ixt)t = set of returns on construction sponsor's stock 'i' within facility sector 'g' at time 
period 't' 
Rmt   = return on market portfolio in period 't' 
αg    = correlation coefficient of constant in facility sector 'g'    
βg   = average beta of construction sponsors within facility sector 'g' (i.e. βenv means the 
average beta of construction sponsors that joined environmental BTL projects,   βmil 
means that of military, βedu means that of schools, and βcult means that of culture BTL 
projects)
The regression result is summarized in the below table:　
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES R(env)(ixt)t R(mil)(ixt)t R(edu)(ixt)t R(cult)(ixt)t
Rmt 1.158*** 1.288*** 1.177*** 1.102***
(0.285) (0.474) (0.259) (0.247)
Constant 0.013 0.0218 -0.0078 0.0218
(0.0263) (0.0544) (0.0259) (0.025)
Table 4. Estimated average beta of construction sponsors in each of facility sectors 
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   R(env)(ixt)t represents the set of returns on construction sponsors that joined 
environmental BTL projects from 2000 to 2014. The correlation coefficient of Rmt on 
R(env)(ixt)t in model (1) means the estimated average beta of construction sponsors that 
joined environment sector BTL projects. The average beta of constructors of 
environmental facility sector (βenv) is estimated as 1.158. The same logic applies to 
other sectors, resulting in the average construction shareholder's beta in military sector 
(βmil) is estimated as 1.288, that for education sector (βedu) is 1.177, and that for 
culture sector (βcult) is 1.102. As is mentioned, the motivation for the stratified 
pooling approach is to see whether there exist a different level of systematic risks 
among facility sectors. The equality of betas are tested using 2-tailed z-test (see 
appendix 2). It is concluded that there is no evidence that betas of all facility sectors 
(βg) are equal to pooled average (βa) under 99% of confidence level, except that of 
environment. However, the beta of environment is different from the pooled average 
(βa) under 95% of confidence level. So, it is determined that stratified betas (table 4) 
for respective facility sectors (βg) should be used to estimate each of the costs of 
equity capitals.  
   The betas are measured from construction sponsors because they are the most 
comparable companies that have isomorphic systematic risk with BTL projects during 
construction period. But the above estimated average betas of the four facility sectors 
(βenv, βmil, βedu, βcult) reflect the financial ratio of construction companies, not that of 
BTL project companies. So, the beta should be adjusted reflecting the average 
financial ratio of BTL projects because our goal is to get the optimal rate of return 
for BTL investment during construction period. The HAMADA model26) can be 
26) Hamada, R.S. (1972) "The Effect of the Firm's Capital Structure on the Systematic Risk of Common Stocks," The Journal of Finance 
Observations 1,600 1,041 2,521 895
R-squared 0.007 0.002 0.008 0.02
Robust  standard errors in parentheses
***  p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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applied to revise estimated sector betas (βg), reflecting the leverage ratio of BTL 
projects different from that of construction sponsors. First, un-levered betas of four 
facility sectors are calculated as follows: 
  
 ×

 



 



                      (4.5)
Di = average (from 2012 to 2014) debt amount of construction sponsors 'i' 
Ei = average (from 2012 to 2014) equity amount of construction sponsors 'i'
 τ  = corporate tax rate   
The sum of debt and equity amounts are calculated based on the same sample of 458 
construction sponsors. The weighted average leverage ratio of 458 construction 
sponsors (





 

 ) is 2.092X. On the basis of this ratio, the un-levered betas of 
facility sectors are calculated. And again, the weighted average leverage ratio of 426 
BTL projects is applied to get revised average betas in each of sectors (βg') as 
below: 
 ′    × ×

 



 


                       
Dj = debt amount of BTL project 'j' 
Ej = equity amount of BTL project 'j'
τ  = corporate tax rate   
   The leverage ratio of respective facility sectors are measured based on historical 
contract data The ratio of environment is 10.43X, that for military is 15.97, that for 
education is 10.82, and that for culture facility is 12.42. Along with the leverage 
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ratio, 24.2% of marginal corporate tax rate of Korea is applied to the formula, 
resulting in below table: 
   A risk free rate (Rf) is also needed to calculate the cost of equity capital (ke). 
Brotherson et. al. (2013) states that "long-term bond yields more closely reflect the 
default-free holding period returns available on long-lived investments and thus more 
closely mirror the types of investments made by companies. The survey results reveal 
a strong preference on the part of practitioners for long-term bond yields. Most of 
the corporations and financial advisors use T-bond yields for maturities of ten years 
or greater, with the ten years rate being the most popular choice. Many corporations 
said they matched the term of the risk-free rate to the tenor of the investment. In 
contrast, a third of sample books suggested subtracting a term premium from 
long-term rates to approximate a shorter term yield. Half of books recommended 
long-term rates but were not precise in the choice of maturity." Vecchi V, et. al. 
(2013) used the UK government bonds maturing in 15, 20, 25, and 30 years to 
estimate sponsor's cost of equity for health PPP. It may be said that there is not a 
decisive theory for selecting a risk free rate (Rf). 
27) The revised levered beta of BTL in construction period seems irrationally high. It is due to the nature of BTL business, which allows high leverage ratio because the SPC is destined to be liquidated when concession is over. Especially, BTL investment is recognized safe and thus, around 5% of minimum equity capital is allowed and remaining 95% is funded through debt. The revised levered beta is high due to the high leverage ratio of BTL however, when the estimated cost of equity is applied to WACC, cost of equity takes small portion, and thus the final result of calculated WACC makes rational range, which is not much different from that of construction industry. Assuming WACC is calculated without reflecting high leverage ratio of BTL, the WACC of environment is 5.72%, military is 6.15%, education is 5.74%, and culture is 5.97%. 
Facility sectors Beta (βg)(constructor's leverage ratio) unlevered Beta Revised Beta (βg') 
27)
(BTL leverage ratio) 
Environment 1.158 0.4478 3.9876
Military 1.288 0.4981 6.5272
Education 1.177 0.4551 4.1885
Culture 1.102 0.4261 4.4389
Table 5. Beta revision reflecting difference in financial ratio 
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   In general, BTL contracts determines contract IRR by adding risk spread (‘ ’) to α
base rate, which is five years sovereign bond. The risk spread (‘ ’) doesn't change α
during the whole investment period, while the base rate (five years bond rate) resets 
every five years. The intention seems that the reset duration is aligned with base rate 
period. Considering this term structure, five years sovereign bond rate is selected as a 
proxy for risk free rate in this research. In line with this observation, all of five-year 
sovereign bond rates at respective contract dates are collected and averaged by sectors 
to get the average risk free rates (Rf) in four sectors. The result of average risk free 
rate in environment is 4.56%, that in military is 4.76%, that in education is 4.95%, 
and that in culture sector is 4.70%. 
   The market risk premium is a spread between expected return of market portfolio 
and risk free rate, meaning a compensation for taking a unit of systematic risk.
  
  Pr                     (4.6)
   In theory, the market premium should be measured from 'ex-ante' market return. 
However, it is technically hard to identify 'market portfolio' and even impossible to 
directly observe 'expected' market return. For this reason, long-term ex-post average of 
stock market return minus long-term average risk free is used as a proxy to market 
risk premium. A possible difference between 'expected' and 'realized' market return 
can be adjusted by using a long-term time-series data and thus, deleting the 
systematic bias of investors. For example, Mehra and Prescott(1985) analyzed 100 
years of past time-series data of United States, and Siegel(1998) worked with 50 
years of data of United Kingdom after World War II. Usually Ibbotson or 
Morningstar data are used as a reference for market premium. Several studies 
suggested the market premium of Korea from 5.4 to 8.1% rage. Choi(2008) suggested 
6%, Kang(2008) maintained 5.45~6.38%, Park(2009) stated 5.67~8.06%, and 
Damodaran(2012) 6.11%. Among the range of research results, 6% of market risk 
premium is selected in this paper. 
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   The revised average beta of four sectors (βg'), risk free rate (Rf), and the market 
risk premium are substituted into CAPM to estimate the optimal level of returns on 
equity (ke) for BTL projects during construction period in the four sectors. The input 
and output data are summarized as follows:  
   In general, several tranches of loans are combined for the financing of 
infrastructures to allocate different risk-return profiles among lenders with diverse risk 
appetites. Typical example of funding structure includes senior and subordinated loans 
with combination of fixed and floating interest rates. However, as is discussed, the 
BTL investment is recognized as buying a sovereign bond that has additional risk of 
construction and operation. For this reason, most of risk aversive investors such as 
pension funds or insurance companies are eager to invest in BTL and thus, a single 
tranche of senior loan can fund the whole amount of debt. That is why the loan 
Items Input data Notes
Revisedaverage sector beta (βg')
environment 3.9876
average beta for each of facility sectors, measured from construction sponsors, and additionally revised reflecting the leverage ratio of BTL projects    
military 6.5272
education 4.1885
culture 4.4389
Risk free rate (Rf)
environment 4.563%
average of five years sovereign bond rate, measured at all of individual contract dates and averaged by sectors 
military 4.760%
education 4.946%
culture 4.697%
Market premium [E(Rm)-Rf] 6% Selected from researches 
Estimated return on equity capital for BTL sectors during construction period Et[ke]
environment 28.4886%
       × ′
military 43.9235%
education 30.0769%
culture 31.3304%
Table 6. Summary of input and output data for CAPM
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structure of BTL is very simple: a single tranche of senior loan. The Standard BTL 
Concession Agreement of Korea defines the cost of debt as three years AA- bond 
rate plus spread. The three years AA- bond rate is determined by the five days 
average of market data ahead of contract date, and revised in every five years 
reflecting market rate. The average cost of debt (kd), in each of four sectors, are 
measured based on the 397 BTL contract data28) from 2005 to 2014. The result of 
average cost of debt in environment sector is 6.828%, that in military is 7.321%, that 
in education is 6.833%, and that in culture is 7.236%. 
   The equity ratio (K) is the relative proportion of equity used to finance total 
asset. The amounts of equity and debt are often taken from the firm's balance sheet 
or market values for both, if a company's equities are publicly traded. In the BTL 
case, few companies are listed and thus, book values at contract points are used in 
calculating equity ratios. The equity ratio (K) measures the proportion of the total 
assets that are financed by shareholders, as opposed to creditors, indicating the level 
of leverage used by a company. Generally, infrastructure funding requires over 20% 
of equity ratio to secure debt against business distress. However, thanks to the stable 
business nature of BTL, minimum 5% of equity ratio is allowed by PPP Basic Plan. 
In practice, market lenders require 5% ~10% of equity ratio for BTL in Korea. The 
two major sorts of equity investors are construction sponsors and financial sponsors: 
the former are interested in Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) 
contracts whereas, the latter are interested in long-term financial return after 
construction. For this reason, during the construction phase, construction sponsors lead 
a project, holding major share of equity. When construction risk is gone and 
operation begins, financial sponsors usually purchase the major share of equity from 
construction sponsors. The average equity shares (K) of four sectors are measured 
based on the 397 BTL contract data from 2005 to 2014. The result of average equity 
share (K) in environment sector is 8.75%, military is 5.89%, education is 8.46%, and 
culture is 7.45%. 
28) 397 projects that provided cost of debt infomration among 426 of population 
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   The standard concession duration of BTL in Korea is 20 years, which is far 
longer than five years and thus, it is appropriate to additionally consider a long-term 
investment premium. The 20 years sovereign bond was first issued in 2006 in Korea. 
The average term spread between five and twenty years bonds from 2006 to 2014 is 
observed as 0.4570%. (refer to the appendix 3) 
   Finally, the optimal average returns during construction period (r*c,t) in four 
facility sectors are estimated, applying above assumptions. The optimal level of 
returns in construction phase are estimated from 7.67% to 8.27% as follows: 
Sectors Et[ke] Et[kd] K WACC term premium r*c,t
environment 28.4886% 6.828% 8.75% 7.22%
0.4570%
7.67%
military 43.9235% 7.321% 5.89% 7.81% 8.27%
education 30.0769% 6.833% 8.46% 7.29% 7.74%
culture 31.3304% 7.236% 7.45% 7.41% 7.87%
Table 7. The optimal return during the construction period (r*c,t)  
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2. The optimal return in operation period (r*o,t)   
(1) Merton's option theory29) and BTL risk premium in operation period
   The Merton Model was developed in early 1970s and has been applied to the 
evaluation of credit risk in corporate's debt. A credit risk is the uncertainty, 
surrounding an entity’s ability to service its debt and obligations. Prior to default, 
there is no way to determine unambiguously an entity whether it will default or not. 
The best ex-ante efforts that we can do is only to make a statistic assessment of the 
default probability based on other benchmark projects. As a matter of course, a 
spread over the default-free rate of interest should be paid to compensate the 
uncertainty proportionally to its default probability. In similar context, Merton's option 
theory, which was originally designed to measure credit risk spread of corporate's 
debt, may be able to provide a practical tool for measuring operation risk of BTL 
contract because the operation cash flow of BTL is isomorphic to risky corporate 
bond. 
   The Merton model assumes there be a single class of bond with par-value of ‘L’ 
and maturity of ‘T’. If the value of asset falls behind the debt amount, company will 
go default. The model is based on the assumption that market is frictionless and the 
movement of risky asset follows geometric brown motion:  
        
Where, the  is the mean rate of return on the assets and  is the asset volatility 
   Basically, the model considers a company’s equity as a call option on its asset. 
While the debt holder’s pay-off at the exercising date has isomorphic position to 
owning a safe debt and shorting a put option underlying the corporate’s asset30). 
29) Robert C. Merton (1972), On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates, Journal of Finance  30) Wang, Y., 2009, Structural Credit Risk Modeling, Society of Actuaries. 
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  min       min         max               (4.7)
 
DT  =  the payoff of debt at maturity 'T' 
VT  =  the value of underlying asset 
L   =  the face value of debt 
   In summary, a corporate debt has a payoff position of shorting a put option and 
possessing a (risk free) bond. 
     (Source: Anthony Sounders and Linda Allen (2012), Credit Risk Measurement) 
   The present value of debt at forecasting point 't' (Dt) can be priced by applying 
the risk neutral expected discounted payoffs of debt and the Black-Shcoles option 
model as follows:  
     max      
         
         
    
    
                  (4.8)
Figure 7. Bond holder's pay-off position at maturity
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  
Ln        
Ln  
Dt  =  the present value of debt at time 't' 
Vt  =  the spot value of underlying asset at 't' 
L   =  the face value of debt 
N(d) = the cumulative probability distribution for a variable that has a standard normal  
distribution with zero mean and one standard deviation (Pease see appendix 10) 
   At the same time, the present value of debt (Dt) can be expressed based on the 
yield to maturity (y) and the face value (L) of debt (        ). This formula 
can be transformed from the viewpoint of 'y' variable (  Ln  ). By 
substituting               to the current value of debt (Dt), the yield to 
maturity (y) can be expressed as below:　 
   
 × Ln 
                            (4.9)
The credit risk spread (s) is a difference between yield to maturity and risk free rate 
(s = y r– ).  By substituting above drawn formula to yield to maturity, the credit 
spread can be expressed as below:  
    
 
 × Ln 
        
 
 × Ln  
  
  
    
  
 
 × Ln  
  
            (4.10)
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   This formula represents the risk spread of corporate’s bond. To make it a simpler 
form, if we put   , the formula can be simplified as follows31):　  
   
 ×Ln  
  
 ′′    
                       (4.11)
   The risk spread(s) is a function of loan and asset value ratio, risk free rate, 
maturity, and degree of asset volatility.  
   As is discussed, the business nature of BTL during the operation period is similar 
to holding a corporate bond that has an uncertainty mainly caused by operation cost.
        
      (Source: PIMAC training material) 
In general, the revenue of BTL is pre-determined government's payment that is 
comprised of 'installment payment(B)' plus 'operation cost(C)'. The 'installment 
payment(B)' is an equal annual payment that includes principal and interest for the 
compensation of the ‘initial capital investment(A)’ plus project return. The sum of 
government's payment(B+C) is pre-determined by contract because the 'operation cost 
(C)' is a budget basis, which does not change even though the 'real operation cost(D)' 
31) This formula is drawn from Black-Scholes put option pricing model, and thus the expression is different from the origial Merton model. However, the original Merton formula is used for the calculation in this research. Please refer to (appendix 10) 
Figure 8. SPC's cash flow in BTL investment
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changes. As a result, ax-ante expectation of net operation cash flow of BTL project 
is the ‘installment payment(B)’32).  
   It is highly probable that the ex-post net operating cash flow deviates from the 
'installment payment(B)' because the 'real operation cost(D)' will probably deviate from 
the 'budget operation cost(C)'. Procuring authority pays operation cost up to the 
pre-determined budget. And thus, if the 'real operation cost(D)' is bigger than the 
'budge(C)', it results in cost-overrun, and at the same time, nibbling the installment 
payment (B). If the 'real operation cost (D)' is smaller than the 'Budget operation cost 
(C)', procuring authority does not pay for the saved cost.33) As a result, the payoff of 
BTL project during operation period is similar to investing in corporate loan that has 
a degree of risk due to the operation cost overrun. 
   There are additional factors that may cause additional volatility such as irregular 
capital investment or government’s payment deduction. One of the examples is the 
uncertainty in government’s payments even though the possibility is not substantial. 
As the pre-determined revenue is paid by government, regardless of usage level in 
BTL, private investors may have moral hazard that they do not operate the subject 
facility not in good condition as is defined by the concession agreement. As a result, 
most of BTL contracts include such clause that a procuring authority can deduct the 
payment based on the performance assessment when the performance of target 
facilities do not meet the pre-determined criteria. This clause is indispensable from the 
public points of view to control above mentioned moral hazard whereas it may cause 
a volatility in net operation income of SPC. 
   In the BTL context, present value of debt at forecasting (t=0) point is same as 
ex-ante value of asset, which means a BTL project company provides the same 
position as investing to a company comprised of same amount of asset and debt. In 
32) Net operating cash flow = (B)Installment payment + (C)Budget operating cost - (D)Actual operating cost. Assuming the ex-ante expectation of (C)Budgetary operating cost equals to (D)Actual operating cost, E(Net operating cash flow) becomes same as the (B)Installment payment 33) In practice, if smaller amount of actual operation cost(cost saving) is expected, SPC makes pre-expenses or promotes early execution 
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summary, BTL project's net asset value during the operation period is same as 
holding series of bonds like installment payments, which value depends on the 
deviation of operation cost plus additional volatility. 
 Value of BTL project = PV [(B)Installment payment + (C)Budget operation cost - (D)Actual 
operation cost] ± other volatility
 Degree of asset value volatility = f [(C)Budget operation cost - (D)Actual operation cost  ± 
other volatility] 
   It being said, the Merton's option model is one of the candidates applicable to the 
risk spread(s) measurement of BTL project during operation period. Although, there 
being several sorts of credit risk theories, the Merton's model is simple in concept, 
and requires only three main variables: degree of asset volatility, a value ratio 　
between asset and debt, and investment maturity. When a risk spread is estimated, the 
optimal BTL return during operation period can be simply calculated by adding risk 
free rate (Rf) and long term investment premium. 
- 43 -
(2) Estimation of the optimal return (r*o,t) in operation period 
   Contemplating on the BTL payment structure in detail, the government's 
installment payment is comprised of 'T' numbers of coupons34), each of which have 
different maturities. The risk spread in each of coupons should be calculated in 
separate because they have different maturities. The measuring approach of BTL risk 
spread during operation period is illustrated as follows: 
0 cst  : coupon risk spread with 't' year's maturity (measured using Merton's option model) 
 rs*o : BTL risk spread in operation period 
  T   : concession period (generally, 20 standard years in Korea) 
The individual coupon spread (0cst) is estimated, applying Merton's option model as 
follows35):  
34) 'T' represents operation maturity in years determined by BTL contract  35) The original form of Merton theory is used in calculating the coupon risk spread (please refer to the appendix 10)  
time
1st Coupon
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 ? t = 19 t = 20
… 
2nd Coupon
3rd Coupon
19th Coupon
20th Coupon
0 cs2 X 2
0 cs3 X 3
0 cs19 X 19
0 cs20 X 20
t = 0 
0 cs1 X 1
… 
Figure 9. Estimation of BTL risk spread during operation period (r*o,t)
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   
 × Ln  
  
 ′ ′    
                    (4.12)
And the optimal risk spread (rs*o) during the whole operation period is calculated by 
weighted average of coupon spreads (0cst) based on the maturity of individual 
coupons. (refer to the appendix 6) 
 





  

 ×                                 (4.13)
   The estimation of optimal BTL return in operation period (r*o,t) begins from 
measuring coupon risk spreads in operation period (0cst). As is discussed, a BTL 
investor’s position is similar to buying a company at a price of bond and shorting a 
put option on a company's asset. If the company's asset value goes below debt 
amount, the debt holder has to bring the ownership of the company. It means the 
exercise price at maturity is the par value of debt, and in case a company's value 
falls short of debt payment, it goes default. The payoff of the debt holder, in this 
case, will be the asset value minus face value of debt. Applying the real option 
theory to BTL case, it can be rationally assumed that the present asset value equals 
to that of   bond36) at forecasting point because the expected operation cost is equal 
to actual in ax-ante basis37). It can be translated that BTL investment has 100% of 
loan to value ratio (LTV) at forecasting phase. Because the necessary input value to 
Merton model is the loan to value ratio (LTV), not an absolute value, simply 'one' 
can be applied. And, it is considered as a default when the value of asset goes under 
loan balance, meaning the loan to value (LTV) becomes higher than 100%. 
36) The net value becomes the sum of present value of installment payment in BTL contract, which is also 'at the money' status in option theory  37) In fact, there exists no actual cost at forecasting point 
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   The remaining necessary variable is the degree of asset volatility. In general, the 
change of an asset value depends on the volatility of future cash flow (net operation 
income in a narrow term), given a constant discount rate. Let's identify   as an 
expected asset value of a BTL project 'j', which value is dependent on expected net 
operation income   and discount rate that is assumed as a given risk free 
rate. It turns out the   can be expressed as a function of  .  
                               (4.14)
The change of asset value at time 't' (∆ ) can be derived as a function of 
deviation on net operating income (∆ ) as below: 
         ∆ 
       ∆   ∆ 
                   (4.15)
Again, the NOI can be decomposed into revenue and operation cost. The 
pre-determined revenue payment is the government's responsibility in BTL contract 
and the government's credit risk is deemed as risk free, which means ∆   
is considered as almost zero. So, the change of asset value (∆Vj) mainly depends on 
the change of operation cost. 
       cos 
∆   ∆   cos  
 ∆ ≈ 
∆  ≈ ∆ cos 
 ∆ ≈  ∆ cos 
∴ ∆    ∆  ≈∆ cos 
          
   Now, what we need to know is the standard deviation of asset value in each of 
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facility sectors (δ(Vg)). The straight-forward way is to measure time-series deviation of 
NOIjt of each project ( (NOIδ jt)). However, a critical problem arises: as the BTL was 
introduced to Korea in 2005, the earliest generation projects commenced their 
operation in 2006. And so, the longest operation duration until 2014 is only nine 
years, which is not enough time series for statistically reliable analysis. 
   The alternative approach for measuring the degree of unexpected volatility of NOI 
may be a cross-sectional analysis. The basic assumption is that a rational investor will 
forecast NOI of a project from the track-record of comparable projects in operation. 
The common knowledge of business states that operation cost is divided into fixed 
and variable that is proportional to revenue. And companies within similar business 
have typical cost structure that can be formulated based on the financial data of 
similar business sector. On the basis of these assumptions, the NOI estimation 
formula is obtained through a cross-sectional regression, and again the estimated NOI 
is obtained by substituting actual revenue into the NOI estimation line. The actual 
NOI data is directly collected from financial statements. The unexpected deviation of 
NOI is measured by calculating the difference between estimated and actual NOI. 
     ∙                         (4.16)
                              ∙
   NOIj  : net operation income of project 'j' 
    Sj    : revenue amount of project 'j' 
    rj    : residual value of estimated NOI in project 'j' 
   Operation risk spread is calculated by consistent categories to construction risk 
measurement: environment, military, school, and culture. As the operation cost 
structures are different depending on facility sectors, the formula of NOI will 
probably be different among sectors. For example, library may have bigger volatility 
than simple sewage pipeline systems. For this reason, not only NOI estimation lines, 
but also the standard deviations of asset values are measured in separate sectors basis. 
The 49 SPCs from environment, 47 from military, 139 from education, and 26 from 
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culture facility sectors are selected as samples for regression analysis.38) The net 
operation incomes (NOI) are regressed on the revenues of 201439) stratified by four 
facility sectors, to get four separate regression lines that explain the relation between 
revenues and net operation incomes. The 'NOI(g)j' represents the net operating income 
of project 'j', and the 'Sj' represents the revenue amount of project 'j' in fiscal year of 
2014. 
The estimated correlation coefficients for revenues () resulted in a range of 0.678 ~ 
0.809, and those of constants ( ) are all negative values. These directions are rational 
because the expected NOI should be positively proportional to sales while it should be 
negative when sales is zero due to a fixed cost. As the regression models are simple 
(one-factored) ones, we rely on the R-squares, all of which are over 0.8. The 
regression lines are illustrated as follows: 
38) Samples are selected when projects meet both criteria of in operation status and showing positive NOI. Which means prospective investors will rationally expect that NOI would be positively correlated with revenue. Please refer to the (appendix 5) for detail statistics.   39) The financial data of 2014 is selected for cross-sectional regression because the latest data provide the biggest number of samples in operation status, and the project companies that had begun operation before 2014 will have a stable NOI. A SPC in early operation status usually shows abnormally low or negative profit due to some extraordinary expenses in beginning stage, such as expenses for testing period or capital expenses etc. In Korea, 18 BTL projects commenced their operation in 2014, and 43 projects begun  in 2013, all of which may have been dropped if 2014 data is not selected.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES NOI(env)j NOI(mil)j NOI(edu)j NOI(cult)j
Sj 0.781*** 0.809*** 0.678*** 0.722***
(0.0599) (0.0261) (0.063) (0.0764)
Constant -4.59E+07 -2.509e+08** -4.55E+07 -2.006e+08*
(1.92E+08) (1.08E+08) (1.93E+07) (1.17E+08)
Observations 49 47 139 26
R-squared 0.895 0.937 0.807 0.827
Robust  standard errors in parentheses
***  p<0.01,  ** p<0.05,  * p<0.1
Table 8. Regression analysis for NOI estimation  
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   The advantage of measuring volatility from NOI instead of operation cost is that 
it can capture deviations generated from operation cost, as well as other unexpected 
factors such as capital expense, revenue deduction for bad performance and so on. 
   Again, the actual revenues of 2014 (Sj) are substituted into the regression lines to 
get expected operation incomes of four sectors. The expected operation incomes are 
subtracted from the actual to get the residual values (  ), which is considered as the 
unexpected deviation of net operation income ∆  and same with the 
unexpected deviation of asset value ∆   under BTL concession. 
                                 (4.17)      
   NOIj   : actual net operating income (reported by F/S) of project 'j'  
  E(NOIj) : estimated net operating income of project 'j' based on regression line 
y = 0.7809 x - 45,855,576.1466 R² = 0.8948 
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Figure 10-1. NOI estimation line (env) 
y = 0.6777 x - 45,530,953.9635 R² = 0.8074 
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Figure 10-3. NOI estimation line (edu)
y = 0.8095 x - 250,942,629.6728 R² = 0.9368 
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Figure 10-2. NOI estimation line (mil)
y = 0.7225 x - 200,589,082.7682 R² = 0.8266 
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Figure 10-4. NOI estimation line (cult)  
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        : estimation error on NOIj (unexpected deviation of NOIj)
   Now we can get the unexpected deviation of asset value ∆  . 
However, it should be transformed into a ratio to asset amount by dividing with asset 
value. 
 ∆ 
∆ 
              (4.18)
   There are two reasons for the re-scaling. First of all, the unexpected deviations of 
asset values (∆  ) are estimated based on the projects with different 
investment scales, so the observed unexpected asset value volatilities in amount basis 
can't be directly compared among projects. Second, the unit of standard deviation ( ) 
identified in Merton's model is the standard deviation in asset value. So, the 
unexpected deviation of asset value (∆  ) should be re-scaled to be 
expressed by a distribution and standard deviation in asset value unit. 
∆   
∆   
        
The result of unexpected deviation of asset value in percentage 
∆   
for respective facility sectors are summarized in the below table:   
Correlation coefficients environment military education culture
 0.781 0.809 0.678 0.722
 -4.59e+07 -2.509e+08 -4.55e+07 -2.006e+08
Table 9. Summary of the correlation coefficients, used for NOI estimation  
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   The means of expected deviations in all sectors are not significantly different from 
zero based on t-value test (please refer to the appendix 7). It means the estimated 
asset value volatility is eligible for Merton's option model as it assumes a random 
walk of asset value volatility. 
Figure 11.  Distributions of unexpected volatility of asset values
The input assumptions for calculating coupon spread (0cst), using Merton's option 
model are summarized as below table: 
Sectors  
∆     
∆  
Environment 0.0001958 0.00586
Military -0.0006510 0.00762
Education -0.0002595 0.01142
Culture 0.0028926 0.01411
Table 10. Unexpected volatility of asset value  
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   The 20 coupon spreads (0cst) with different maturities from one to twenty years 
are calculated applying above assumptions to Merton's option model. The coupon 
spreads (0cst) for each of maturities are estimated in four separate sectors.  
Asset value Asset value(t=0) = Bond value(t=0) = 1.00    (100% LTV ratio in ex-ante basis)Bond value 
Duration (t)  1 ~ 20 years 
Asset value volatility 
 
∆ 
Environment :  0.00586 Military     :  0.00762Education   :  0.01142Culture     :  0.01411 
Risk free rate (Rf) 
Environment :  4.563% Military     :  4.760%Education   :  4.946%Culture     :  4.697%
Table 11. Assumptions for estimating risk spread of operation period
maturity (t) environment military education culture( = 0.00586)δ ( = δ 0.00762) ( = δ 0.01142) ( = δ 0.01411)
1st coupon 0.2341% 0.3045% 0.4565% 0.5644%
2nd coupon 0.1656% 0.2155% 0.3231% 0.3996%
3rd coupon 0.1353% 0.1760% 0.2640% 0.3265%
4th coupon 0.1172% 0.1525% 0.2288% 0.2830%
5th coupon 0.1049% 0.1364% 0.2047% 0.2533%
6th coupon 0.0957% 0.1246% 0.1870% 0.2314%
7th coupon 0.0887% 0.1154% 0.1732% 0.2143%
8th coupon 0.0830% 0.1080% 0.1621% 0.2006%
9th coupon 0.0782% 0.1018% 0.1529% 0.1892%
10th coupon 0.0742% 0.0966% 0.1451% 0.1796%
11th coupon 0.0708% 0.0921% 0.1384% 0.1713%
12th coupon 0.0678% 0.0882% 0.1325% 0.1641%
13th coupon 0.0651% 0.0848% 0.1274% 0.1577%
14th coupon 0.0628% 0.0817% 0.1228% 0.1520%
Table 12. Estimated coupon spread with maturity 't' (0cst)
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The optimal risk spread of the whole operation period (rs*o,t) is calculated based on 
the time weighted average of estimated coupon spreads (0cst). 
15th coupon 0.0607% 0.0790% 0.1187% 0.1469%
16th coupon 0.0587% 0.0765% 0.1149% 0.1423%
17th coupon 0.0570% 0.0742% 0.1115% 0.1381%
18th coupon 0.0554% 0.0721% 0.1084% 0.1343%
19th coupon 0.0539% 0.0702% 0.1055% 0.1307%
20th coupon 0.0526% 0.0685% 0.1029% 0.1274%
t t × coupon spread (0cst)    environment     military education culture
1 0.2341% 0.3045% 0.4565% 0.5644%
2 0.3313% 0.4309% 0.6463% 0.7991%
3 0.4059% 0.5280% 0.7921% 0.9796%
4 0.4688% 0.6100% 0.9152% 1.1320%
5 0.5243% 0.6822% 1.0237% 1.2665%
6 0.5745% 0.7476% 1.1220% 1.3882%
7 0.6207% 0.8077% 1.2124% 1.5002%
8 0.6637% 0.8637% 1.2967% 1.6047%
9 0.7041% 0.9164% 1.3759% 1.7028%
10 0.7423% 0.9662% 1.4508% 1.7957%
11 0.7786% 1.0136% 1.5222% 1.8842%
12 0.8134% 1.0589% 1.5904% 1.9688%
13 0.8468% 1.1023% 1.6559% 2.0500%
14 0.8789% 1.1442% 1.7189% 2.1282%
15 0.9099% 1.1846% 1.7798% 2.2037%
16 0.9398% 1.2237% 1.8387% 2.2768%
17 0.9689% 1.2616% 1.8958% 2.3477%
18 0.9971% 1.2984% 1.9513% 2.4165%
Table 13. Optimal BTL risk spread in operation periods (rs*o,t)   
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   On top of the estimated risk spread, risk free rates (Rf)40) and a long-term 
investment premium (refer to appendix 3) are added to get the optimal return for 
BTL projects in operation period (r*o,t) as below table: 
40) The risk free rates are estimated in a consistent way to optimal return in construction period: all of the five years sovereign bond rates at respective contract dates are collected and averaged in each of sectors  
Sectors risk spread in operation period (rs*o,t)
risk free rate 
(Rf)
long term premium 
optimal return in operation period (r*o,t)
Environment 0.0690% 4.5632%
0.457%
5.0892%
Military 0.0898% 4.7603% 5.3071%
Education 0.1349% 4.9457% 5.5376%
Culture 0.1670% 4.6970% 5.3210%
Table 14. Optimal BTL risk spread (rs*o,t) and return (r*o,t) in operation period 
19 1.0246% 1.3342% 2.0053% 2.4836%
1.0513% 1.3691% 2.0579% 2.5489%20
14.4789% 18.8478% 28.3076% 35.0417%Sum
 





  

  ×  0.0689% 0.0898% 0.1348% 0.1669%
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3. The optimal return (r*t) and risk spread ( *) of BTL projects α
   The optimal level of life-cycle BTL investment return (r*t) is estimated by ϴ 
weighted average based on the optimal returns in construction period (r*c,t) and 
operation period (r*o,t). The weighting factor ' ' is the share of return for construction ϴ
period in total. The derivation of ' ' is shown in (appendix 8). ϴ
   ∙   ∙                       (4.19)
r*t  : optimal return for BTL project assessed at time 't' (beginning of project) 
r*c,t : optimal rate of return for construction period
r*o,t : optimal rate of rerun for operation period 
ϴ  : share of return for construction period in total 
 
   Finally, the optimal risk spread ( *) of BTL is calculated by subtracting risk free α
rates (Rf) from the above optimal project returns (r*t) of BTL. Now, the estimated 
optimal risk spread ( *) is fairly comparable with historical contract alpha ( ). α α
41) Track record of average contract returns ( ) are summarized for reference purpose.  
sectors r*c,t r*o,t θ r*t  41)
environment 7.6726% 5.0892% 0.1291 5.423% 5.61%
military 8.2680% 5.3071% 0.1289 5.689% 5.97%
education 7.7424% 5.5376% 0.1293 5.823% 6.09%
culture 7.8676% 5.3210% 0.1291 5.650% 6.05%
Table 15. Optimal BTL return for the life cycle project period   
sectors r*t Rf * α (= r*t – Rf)  
environment 5.423% 4.5632% 0.8594% 1.03%
Table 16. Optimal BTL risk spread ( *α ) and contract average ( )
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   The optimal average risk spread ( *) of environment sector is estimated as α
0.859% and the historical average alpha of 96 contracts is 1.03%. The optimal spread 
of military sector is estimated as 0.928% and the historical average of 70 military 
contracts is 1.17%. The optimal spread of education sector is 0.877% and the 
historical average of 218 education contracts is 1.14%. The optimal average risk 
spread of culture sector is measured as 0.953%, but the average track-record spread 
of 42 culture facilities is 1.301%, which is far higher than the estimation result of 
optimal level. 
 
   Intuitively speaking, the physical complexity of product and expected degree of 
deviation in construction and operating costs are reflected into the different levels of 
military 5.689% 4.7603% 0.9284% 1.17%
education 5.823% 4.9457% 0.8769% 1.14%
culture 5.650% 4.6970% 0.9528% 1.30%
Figure 12. Contract average and optimal level of risk spread ( *) α
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optimal alpha. Examples of the environment facilities are sewage systems that are 
networks of pipelines buried under ground, causing the lowest operation risk. 
Whereas, examples of military facilities are simple structured town houses or 
apartments. Most of education facilities are schools including several story buildings 
and additional structures such as dining room, auditorium, playground or gym etc. 
The optimal return of military sector is slightly higher than that of education sector 
due to the higher average beta of construction sponsors but the gap is not significant. 
Culture facilities have to meet diverse visitor’s requirements, and each building needs 
unique design to fulfill the purpose of cultural need, causing the highest operation 
risk. It can be maintained that the required risk premium of BTL facility implicitly 
reflects the degree of expected risk for construction and volatility of net operating 
income.  
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4. Hypothesis test    
   Based on the above study on optimal risk spread, the null hypothesis (Ho) is 
tested to draw a conclusion.   
  The null hypothesis is 'the historical average of BTL contract spread (alpha) is 
statistically not different level from the optimal risk spread in Korea'. And the 
alternative hypothesis is 'there is no evidence that the historical average of BTL 
contract spread (alpha) is statistically not different level from the optimal risk spread 
in Korea'. The track record of average and standard deviations of risk spread ( ) in α
four groups of BTL contracts are summarized in the below table: 
      Two-tailed z-test is performed. If the calculated z-value in absolute number is 
bigger than the critical value, the null hypothesis should be rejected. The z-values of 
four facility groups are calculated based on the below formula and compared with the 
critical value with 99% of confidence level. The hypothesis test results are 
summarized in the below table: 
statistics  environment military education culture
contract average ( ) 1.027% 1.166% 1.138% 1.301%
standard deviation of alpha 0.00177 0.00127 0.00188 0.00325
number of observations 96 70 218 42
optimal alpha ( *)α  0.8594% 0.9284% 0.8769% 0.9528%
Table 17. Historical alpha and optimal level estimation result  
      
     ≠ 
       : average contract BTL risk spread of Korea  
            : optimal level of BTL risk spread
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 

  
                               (4.20)
Where,     ±     
    
   The null hypothesis is rejected in all sectors under 99% of confidence level. The 
test result reveals that the average contract risk spread (alpha) in all sectors are above 
optimal level, maybe influenced by additional idiosyncratic factors. As a result, there 
is no evidence that BTL market of Korea is fully efficient. The degree of excess 
spread of alpha are different among groups: the excess spread of alpha in 
environment sector is 0.1677%p, military sector is 0.2380%p, education sector is 
0.2619%p, and culture sector is 0.3482%p. It is concluded that, as is usual, there 
exist inefficiency in BTL market of Korea but the level of excess returns are 
different among sectors. 
   One thing that should be mentioned is the higher level of contract alpha than the 
optimal level does not necessarily mean a mis-pricing. The historical contract alpha 
must have been determined reflecting both systematic and part of idiosyncratic risks. 
A considerable portion of idiosyncratic risk may not be fully removed by 
diversification in the real world, especially in infrastructure market. As a result, if 
market is not fully efficient, the optimal risk spread is conceptually different from a 
test  environment military education culture
z - values 9.0757 15.1842 20.2418 6.7570
Comparison against critical value Z >    Z >    Z >    Z >   
Hypothesis : Ho Rejected with 99% confidence Rejected with 99% confidence Rejected with 99% confidence Rejected with 99% confidence
Table 18. The hypothesis test result 
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fair market price which should be determined including idiosyncratic risk that is 
unique in infrastructure market and thus individual investor can not remove any more 
even with best effort. 
   However, considering the existence of excess return, it may be said that policy 
makers has a chance to make efforts for enhancing market efficiency and controlling 
BTL return within affordable level in overall. One of such effort for reducing the gap 
between contract and optimal alpha may be a rigorous project assessment using a 
lower hurdle rate. Korean government tried to control average BTL risk spread within 
Nationally affordable level from the commencement of BTL in 2005. The ex-ante 
project assessment is performed to secure value-for-money (Vfm), where the 6% of 
discount rate is currently used, meaning the hurdle of investor’s IRR is allowed up to 
6%. As the 6% of hurdle rate is higher than the optimal level, some of the projects 
may exploit excess return, although not substantial. The above (table 15) compares 
the optimal level of BTL return with the average contract record in each sector. The 
average contract return of environment sector is 0.19%p, military sector is 0.28%p, 
education sector is 0.27%p, and that of culture sector is 0.40%p higher than the 
optimal returns. Based on the study result, optimal level of average BTL return 
reflecting systematic risk is around 5.4% ~ 5.8%, which result is below the current 
6% of hurdle rate. 
   In conclusion, the result of hypothesis test indicates that there remains a room for 
enhancing public benefit by improving market inefficiency and decreasing project 
return. Probably, there will exist different levels of idiosyncratic factors in respective 
sectors. The following chapter empirically investigates what idiosyncratic factors 
influenced how much impact on alpha to draw policy implications and conclusion. 
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V. Idiosyncratic determinants of BTL project return   
    
   Systematic risk is caused by market structure or dynamics which produce 
uncertainty faced by all companies in the market. In contrast, idiosyncratic42) risk is 
uncertainty to which only specific company or industries are vulnerable, and it is 
uncorrelated with broad market returns. Due to the idiosyncratic nature of 
unsystematic risk, it can be reduced or eliminated through diversification however, 
since all market actors are vulnerable to systematic risk, it cannot be hedged through 
diversification.  
   The chapter 'IV. Optimal BTL risk premium for BTL projects' searched the 
optimal level of risk spread for BTL projects from the theoretical point of view and 
compared it with historical average. It is assumed that investors can constitute a fully 
diversified portfolio to achieve an efficient invest line by getting rid of unsystematic 
risk. As a result, the optimal project return is considered as a compensation for 
systematic risk that can't be reduced any more. It means the theory assumes an 
efficient equilibrium market that is hard to exist in the real world, especially in PPP 
market. And thus, idiosyncratic factors that additionally influenced on contract return 
are not considered in the theoretical level of risk spread, but they may explain the 
discrepancies between theoretical and actual spreads. 
   In practice, the contract return is determined through negotiation and benchmarking 
to former comparable projects. Of course, the contract return of infrastructure reflects 
various factors that are unique to specific projects. The infrastructure market is known 
as one of the most inefficient possibly due to information asymmetry, mega size 
capital requirement, and multi-disciplinary expertise requirement, etc. And that, most of 
the local SPCs are unlisted, which business data are hard to be accessed by public. 
The core idea of PPP is sharing risk between public and private parties and thus, the 
degree of shared risk to private party changes depending on the risk allocation clause of 
42) The term of ‘idiosyncratic’ is used interchangeably with ‘unsystematic’ in this research 
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contract. As a result, contract terms or policy directions at contract point can make a 
severe influence on the required rate of return.   
   It being said, the empirical analysis is additionally performed to fully understand 
idiosyncratic factors that affected on contract return, degree of influence, and to draw 
policy considerations. The categories of candidate factors are macro financial market, 
unique characteristics of individual project, PPP policy, and the degree of market 
maturity, etc. Through the empirical analysis in this chapter, we expect to get 
additional understandings on the determinants of contract return in practice, and may 
be able to draw some political implication for further improvement of public good. 
1. Historical profit level of BTL contracts   
   Most of the social infrastructures that do not generate enough cash to compensate 
capital investment are built through BTL in Korea. Examples are environment 
facilities, military bases, schools, and culture facilities. The average return of 426 
BTL contracts from 1995 to 2014 is 5.96%, ranging from 3.46% to 8.48%. The 
project returns in the early period was 5~6%. It gradually increased up to 6~7% level 
until 2009, and again decreased down to around 4% level in 2010. The recent 
contracts even show mid 3% of return due to the dramatic depression of interest rate 
in Korea. 
   The contract return is comprised of risk spread (alpha) and five years variable 
sovereign bond rate, which is considered as a proxy to risk free rate. The risk spread 
(alpha) is determined by contract and shall not be changed throughout concession 
period. As a result, the meaningful milestone that really determines the profit of project 
is the risk spread (so called, alpha) in BTL. The average alpha of 426 local BTL 
contracts from 1995 to 2014 is 1.13%, ranging from 0.03% to 3%. The time-series 
contract risk spread (alpha) didn't show a trend, having been very flat. However, in 
2014, it has dropped down to about 1% level due to the depressed financial market 
and hard competition in local market. The time-series trend and distribution of alpha 
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are as below:  
(Source: Comprehensive PPP evaluation, PIMAC)  
 
(Source: Comprehensive PPP evaluation, PIMAC)  
Figure 14. Distribution of historical contract alpha  
Figure 13. Time series trend of contract alpha  
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The recognized investment risk of the four major sectors of facilities: environment, 
military, education, and culture facilities are probably different to investors, and so the 
average risk spread (alpha) for each category shall be different. The statistics of 
contract alpha in four sectors are summarized in the below table: 
(Source : Vfm assessment guideline for BTL PIMAC)
   As is discussed, the alpha spreads of the four categories don’t show clear 
time-series trends, having a steady level respectively for each category. However, the 
alpha showed a bit inverse proportional to base (five years bond) rate because the 
base rate continually decreased while the level of alpha increased a bit slowly. An 
empirical analysis through OLS is performed to study what factors influenced how 
much impact on the risk spread alpha on top of the systematic risk factors.   
43) Five days average of five years sovereign bond rate at each of the contract dates 
statistics Minimum Average Maximum
Environment(96 projects)
Project IRR 3.46 5.61 6.81
Base rate 43) 2.83 4.59 5.98
Risk spread (alpha) 0.5 1.03 1.38
Military(70 projects)
Project IRR 4.89 5.97 8.48
Base rate 3.97 4.81 7.39
Risk spread (alpha) 0.79 1.17 1.29
Education (218 projects)
Project IRR 3.61 6.09 7.68
Base rate 2.93 4.96 6.12
Risk spread (alpha) 0.08 1.14 1.70
Culture(42 projects) 
Project IRR 4.11 6.05 7.17
Base rate 2.79 4.75 5.83
Risk spread (alpha) 0.86 1.30 3.00
Table 19. Project return and alpha statistics  
 (unit, %)
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2. Empirical analysis  
   The four categories of candidate variables that may explain the level of BTL risk 
spread are selected as follows: 
   The first category is the financial market factors. They are definitely not 
idiosyncratic factors but systematic market factors. The reason that market factors are 
included in the analysis is a control purpose. If these conditions are not controlled, 
we can not fairly compare the impact of idiosyncratic variables in a equal condition. 
For example, if one contract is made when risk free rate is 5% and the other is 
made when risk free rate is 8%, the starting point of alpha will be different from the 
Category Determinants Exogenous Variable 
Financial market
risk free rate (rf) five years sovereign bond rate at individual contract point  
market risk spread(aa_rf) AA
- corporate bond rate minus five years sovereign bond rate at individual contract point 
Project characteristics
funding cost spread (kd_spread) total debt funding cost minus base rate (AA
- corporate bond) at individual contract point  
facility type (milit, edu, cult,)
environment facilities being base case, military, education, and culture facilities are assigned as binomial variables to stratify facility types. 
project size(invest_size) natural log of investment amount in million won
subsidy grant (sub_binom)
binomial variable: one is assigned if subsidy is granted, and zero is assigned if subsidy is not granted  
Procuring process
procuring authority (authority) binomial variable: central ministries being base case, one is assigned to municipal governments 
preparation period(period) 
preparation and negotiation duration from Request for Proposal (RFP) announcement to contract date (in days) 
Market maturity bidding ratio  (bid_ratio) number of bidders joined preferred bidder selection process  
Table 20. Candidate determinants of risk spread (alpha)  
- 65 -
beginning, and the degree of impact due to idiosyncratic factors will probably be 
misled. As a representative risk fee rate (Rf) in market factor, the five years 
sovereign bond rate is selected. The market risk spread (aa_Rf) is presented by risk 
spread between AA- corporate bond and risk free rate that is consistently measured 
by five years sovereign bond rate. A concern may be raised that a possible 
correlation between risk free rate (Rf) and market risk spread (aa_Rf) may cause a 
‘multicollinearity’ issue to the regression models.  So, similar regression tests are 
performed excluding the risk free rate variable to check if the result is significantly 
changed (please refer to appendix 8). 
   The second category is idiosyncratic factors that are unique to individual projects 
or sectors. The funding cost spread (kd_spread) represents the cost of debt funding in 
project level. To reduce a possibility of correlation with market factors, the risk 
spread of individual project funding is selected as variable. The risk spread of 
individual project funding, which should be able to show the difference of funding 
cost caused by individual project risk and sponsor’s credit, is calculated by total 
funding cost minus AA- bond rate at each of contract points. It is expected that if a 
funding cost of individual project increases, the required alpha increases, too. The 
project types (milit, edu, cult) are binomial variables that stratify the average 
difference of alpha among sectors. It is highly possible that investors will require 
different levels of alpha depending on forecasted levels of construction and operation 
risk. The project size (invest_size) may affect to the level of alpha maybe due to the 
risk averseness of human being or economy of scale. In case the former factor is 
stronger, the correlation coefficient of this variable will be positive but if the latter 
factor is stronger, the result can be negative. The subsidy (sub_binom) is a binomial 
variable that one is assigned when subsidy is granted and zero is assigned if not. 
This variable is selected to see if significant difference occurs in alpha due to a 
provision of subsidy. A subsidy has a smaller importance in BTL compared with 
BTO, where it is granted to make a project financially feasible in case project does 
not meet minimum level of required IRR. Most of the transportation infrastructures 
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are lack of commercial viability due to the low level of user fees in many 
economies. By injecting some amount of construction subsidy, the capital investment 
of private party decreases, resulting in enhanced IRR of private investors if the 
forecasted revenue is same. Anyway, there is no concern for financial feasibility in 
BTL because project IRR is pre-determined by the level of government’s installment 
payment, and thus there is little motivation for providing subsidy in BTL. That’s why 
only only 22 numbers of projects among 426 of total population have construction 
subsidy. 
   The procuring authority (authority) and project preparation period (period) are 
variables related with preparation process. The procuring authorities may have different 
criteria in determining alpha. So, they are categorized as central ministry which is 
assigned zero, and municipal governments which are assigned one. The project 
preparation period is measured by the number of days from RFP announcement to 
contract date of each project. It is expected if a project is prepared for longer period 
with enough negotiation, the alpha may be lower than others. 
   The market maturity is measured by market competition: the historical bidding 
ratio (bid_ratio) in preferred bidder selection process. It is expected that as market 
gets matured, the degree of competition will increase, and as a result, the level of 
alpha may decrease.  
    Using above factors as exogenous and contract risk spread (alpha) as endogenous 
variables, a regression analysis is performed. The degree of influence can be 
statistically analyzed by translating the result of correlation coefficients and standard 
errors. The 426 contract data are used for the analysis. The regression results of three 
models are summarized as below: 
 (1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES alpha alpha alpha
    
rf -0.0877*** -0.0871*** -0.0893***
 (0.0150) (0.0146) (0.0148)
Table 21. Regression result of alpha on determinants 
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   Robust standard errors in parentheses
   *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
   The above table shows three steps of trial to find out the fittest one, which is 
model(2). All of the candidate determinants are included in the first model, from 
which variables that don't meet confidence level of 90% are excluded in model(2). 
From the first and second trial, it is concluded there is no evidence that the three 
variables: ‘sub_binom’, ‘authority’ and 'period' do not meet 90% of confident level 
and thus, they are excluded. As a result, most of the correlation coefficients of 
remaining variables in model(2) meet over 95% of confidence level. And all of the 
remaining variables in model(3) show p-values that are small enough even though 
sector dummies are additionally pulled out. It also provides an evidence of robustness. 
The correlation coefficient of constant is statistically significant in all cases. As the 
main purpose of the empirical analysis was to understand the impact of idiosyncratic 
aa_rf -0.0599*** -0.0601*** -0.0613***
 (0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0126)
kd_spread 0.186*** 0.187*** 0.207***
 (0.0267) (0.0265) (0.0264)invest_size -0.0428** -0.0413** -0.0706***
 (0.0173) (0.0168) (0.0147)
sub_binom 0.0376   
 (0.0395)   
bid_ratio -0.0213** -0.0214** -0.0236**
 (0.0100) (0.00987) (0.00997)
authority -0.0175   
 (0.0411)   
period 1.21e-05   
 (6.51e-05)   
milit 0.0727 0.0906***  
 (0.0514) (0.0331)  
edu 0.0902*** 0.0928***  
 (0.0295) (0.0270)  
cult 0.173*** 0.182***  
 (0.0411) (0.0378)  
Constant 1.775*** 1.743*** 2.128***
 (0.222) (0.210) (0.189)
    
Observations 329 329 329
R-squared 0.395 0.393 0.347
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factors on alpha, the constant was out of interest when designing the test. However, 
it may be said that the average alpha of BTL is 2.128%, assuming all the other 
variables such as risk free rate, market risk spread, interest cost spread, investment 
size, and bidding ratio be zero.  
(1) Financial market
   In the result of second regression model, the correlation coefficient of ‘risk free 
rate (rf)’ is estimated as (-)0.0871, which result means if other conditions are equal 
and the risk free rate increases 1%p, the average alpha will decrease 0.0871%p. That 
of ‘market risk spread (aa_rf)’ is estimated as (-)0.0601, which result also means if 
other conditions are equal and the the market risk spread increases 1%p, the alpha 
will decrease 0.0601%p in average.  
   The results are consistent with the observation that market interest rate gradually 
decreased, while alpha spread increased slowly for a decade in the local market. It 
can be explained by the market competition of Korea and long-term investment nature 
of PPP. In practice, investors recognize BTL as a long-term business and thus they 
are tend to maintain total IRR within bankable range. If base rate decreases, investors 
tend to increase alpha to compensate long-term IRR within limited scope. In the other 
way round, if base rate increases, investors are willing to decrease alpha to win a bid 
within limited scale. If investors decrease alpha too much, they will be open to 
ruinous long-term interest rate risk when base rate decreases. This result provides an 
empirical evidence that the total return of BTL has some degree of rigidity against 
market interest rate. And it strengthens the observation that investors tend to look for 
a long-term spread and thus, temporary decrease of market rate makes them increase 
alpha in some degree to secure the total investment return over minimum investable 
level of total return, and vice versa if market rate increases. 
   One possible concern in the analysis may be a correlation between risk free rate 
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(Rf) and market risk spread (aa_Rf). Which relation may cause a ‘multicollinearity’ 
issue to the regression models. So, similar regression tests are performed excluding 
the risk free rate (Rf) variable. Small changes occurred in the analysis results 
however, most of the implications and translations are kept same as the above 
original models. The test result excluding risk free rate variable is added in appendix. 
(please refer to the appendix 9)  
(2) Project characteristics 
   As is explained, the nature of BTL investment is similar to buying a sovereign 
bond that has additional risk of construction and operation. The net cash flow of 
equity investor is the project return minus debt funding (interest) cost. As a result, 
the project return should be able to cover required minimum return on equity plus 
debt funding cost, which is generally determined by three years AA- bond rate plus 
funding cost spread44) in the local PF market. In summary, alpha represents interest 
revenue whereas, beta represents interest cost from the viewpoint of equity holders in 
BTL. So, investors will bid alpha, which level is able to cover both the funding cost 
spread and equity holder’s target profit. Of course, the funding cost spread is priced 
in project financing (PF) market based on project risk and investor’s credit ratings, 
both of which are given condition to investors. It being said, it is natural if funding 
cost spread level increases alpha should increase, too. In the above empirical analysis 
result, the correlation coefficient of the ‘funding cost spread (aa_rf)’ showed 0.187, 
which is one of the strongest exogenous variables. It is concluded that, if other 
conditions being equal and the funding cost spread (kd_spread) increases 1%p, the 
average alpha increases 0.187%p under 99% of confidence. It is found that the 
funding cost has a strong impact on the contract alpha. One of the reasons that the 
average risk spread of environment sector could be lower than other sectors is the 
44) The ‘funding cost spread’ here is the interest rate spread over base rate of ‘funding’ cost. It does not have relationship with the risk spread (alpha) for investors in BTL projects.    
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lowest average funding cost spread. The average funding cost spread in environment 
sector is 1.3267%, which is the lowest level, compared with other sectors: 1.5267% 
in military, 1.4073% in education, and 1.6600% in culture. In summary, the lowest 
funding cost of environmental facility sector contributed to forming the average 
market risk spread (alpha) in the lowest level. 
   The ‘investment size (invest_size)’ variable has the correlation coefficient of 
(-)0.0413, which result means if other conditions are equal and the investment amount 
increases by $106.e, the average alpha will decrease 0.0413%p under 99% confidence 
level. Regardless of the statistical confidence level, the value of correlation coefficient 
is too small to say investment size has meaningful impact to alpha, considering the 
unit amount of independent variable is natural log of million US dollars. It can be 
said that a project size does not have meaningful influence on the contract risk 
spread (alpha), which fact may suggest two things. First of all, BTL investors don’t 
require increased marginal return for bigger investment size. It may be caused by the 
risk profile of BTL, which most investors recognize as similar to buying a sovereign 
bond after the subject facility is constructed. This observation also supports the 
application of bond valuation approach, the Merton’s option model in this research. 
The impact of size variable can also explain why bundling of BTL projects such as 
schools or dormitories are popular and effective. Second guess is that BTL projects 
are small sized compared with BTO projects and the difference of size among 
projects is not significant. So, the marginal impact of investment value to alpha 
spread may have been limited. When the binomial variables that stratify sectors are 
excluded in (model 3), it is observed that the absolute value of correlation coefficient 
of size variable increases. This means the impact of size deviation across sectors are 
bigger than the deviation within a sector.  
   The ‘subsidy (sub_binom)’ variable shows correlation coefficient that is not 
statistically reliable. As is expected, the construction subsidy has almost no 
relationship with the level of contract alpha. In general, the construction subsidy is 
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granted to boost project return in case a project is financially not feasible due to a 
low demand in BTO. However, in BTL project, as procuring authority pays fixed 
amount of installment payments, there remains no demand risk to private investors. 
One of the reason that procuring authority grants subsidy in BTL is to allocate 
government's burden between present and future. That is why construction subsidy is 
granted to only small portion of samples (22 projects among 426 of total population). 
   The correlation coefficients of dummy variables such as ‘milt’, ‘edu’, ‘cult’ 
indicate the difference of average alpha spread among sectors, controlling other 
conditions being equal. On the basis of regression analysis result, historical BTL 
investors in military sector required 0.091%p higher risk spread than the investors in 
environment sector under 99% confidence level. In the same way, the investors in 
education sector required 0.093%p higher, and those in culture sector required 
0.182%p higher risk spread than environment sector under 99% confidence level. 
   Comparing this result with the optimal level of alpha, the stratified differences 
among sectors by regression analysis is bigger. For example, the average risk spread 
of military group is 0.091%p higher than that of environment sector based on the 
regression analysis, while the gap of risk spreads between environment and military 
sectors is only 0.069% based on the optimal alpha. The below table shows the gaps 
of average alpha among sectors based on empirical regression analysis and those from 
optimal level estimation.  
 
   However, the above gaps among groups can not fairly compared. The stratified 
methodology environment military education culture 
empirical regression analysis N/A 0.091%p 0.093%p 0.182%p
estimatedoptimal
optimal alpha 0.8594% 0.9284% 0.8769% 0.9528%
gap over environment sector N/A 0.069%p 0.018%p 0.093%p
Table 22. Difference of average risk spread over environment sector 
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difference of spreads among groups in the first line of above table is calculated, with 
other conditions controlled. However, the difference of average alpha among groups in 
the third line is calculated based on the optimal alpha that all other different 
conditions are reflected. For this reason, additional test is performed to fairly compare 
the degree of difference in average alpha among sectors based on the regression line 
(model 3). The regression line can be expressed as below formula:  
     ×   ×    ×   ×    ×    
     
And the alpha of all projects are estimated by substituting historical data to all the 
variables in the below line:  
    ×  ×   ×   ×    ×  
     
The residual value of alpha in all projects are calculated (     ), and the 
distribution of residual values (ri) in respective sectors are measured as below table: 
 
The means of residual value in above table represent the degree of gap from average 
market line for alpha of each sector. As such, the third line represents the gap of 
each sector’s average alpha over environment sector. The mean of environment is 
negative and that of culture is positive, which means the average contract alpha of 
environment sector exists below the average market line and that of culture sector is 
ri environment military education culture
mean -0.0735% -0.0122% -0.0037% 0.0754%
SSE 0.0329 0.0104 0.0319 0.0560
gap of means
over environment N/A 0.061%p 0.070%p 0.150%p 
Table 23. Distribution of estimation errors (ri) in four sectors
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located above the line. 
 
Now, the different levels of average alpha among sectors can be fairly compared. The 
gap of military over environment sector in (table 23) is about 0.061%, which is close 
to the gap of optimal alpha, 0.069% in (table 24). However, education and culture 
sectors have higher gaps over environment sector in the regression analysis based on 
contract record. It confirms that investors in education and culture sectors required 
higher excess returns implicitly recognizing additional idiosyncratic factors. This test 
shows different levels of excess returns exist depends on sectors. 
(3) Procuring process and Market maturity  
   
   The ‘procuring authority (authority)’ variable is included to test whether a 
difference in procuring authority may cause an influence on the contract alpha in 
BTL. The correlation coefficient of 'authority' variable is not reliable under 90% of 
confidence level. In conclusion, there is no evidence that risk spread (alpha) has 
meaningful difference due to procuring authority.  
   The ‘preparation period (period)’ variable is included to test how much impact the 
project preparation period (in days) has on the contract alpha. From the above 
analysis result, it is concluded that there is no statistical evidence that project 
preparation period influences on the project spread, alpha. 
   The variable, ‘bid_ratio’ represents the number of bidders who joined the preferred 
estimation result Environment Military Education Culture
Optimal alpha 0.8594% 0.9284% 0.8769% 0.9528%
spread over 
environment sector N/A 0.069%p 0.018%p 0.093%p
Table 24. Gap of optimal alpha among sectors  
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bidder selection. The correlation coefficient of bid_ratio variable is (-)0.0214, which 
means the alpha spread decreases 0.0214%p as one additional bidder joins. This 
variable has a unique characteristics, different from other variables, in that market 
competition can contribute to public good through increased efficiency. It is concluded 
that the degree of PPP market competition (or maturity) can contribute to public good 
by decreasing required rate of return for private investors. One of the reasons that the 
average alpha of environment sector is formed to the lowest level may be the highest 
average bid ratio, which is 2.270 (that of military is 1.710, that of education sector is 
2.100, and that of culture sector is 2.020). Compared with others, the culture sector 
has the smallest number of BTL track record45) and so, it can be said that the BTL 
market of culture sector has the lowest maturity than other groups. It may be able to 
explain part of reason why the excess return of culture is exceptionally higher than 
any other sectors. 
45) Total population of culture group is only 42, which is far smaller than other groups: 96 in environment, 70 in military, and 218 in education.  
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VI. Policy implication
   The hypothesis test in chapter indicates that the average contract risk Ⅳ 
spread is different from the optimal level. And it is concluded that there remains 
a room for enhancing public benefit by improving market inefficiency and 
decreasing project return. The empirical test of the chapter reveals the funding Ⅴ 
cost has the strongest impact on the contract alpha. For example, the lowest 
average funding cost of environment sector contributed to forming the lowest 
average contract alpha. Another reason for low level of alpha in environment 
sector is the highest bid ratio, which is 2.27046). It is also found that the BTL 
market of culture sector has the lowest market competition as well as the lowest 
maturity than other groups, resulting in the highest level of deviation of average 
contract alpha from the optimal level of risk spread. The distribution of residual 
values measured from regression line (model 3) also supports the result of 
hypothesis test in chapter that different levels of excess returns exist among Ⅳ 
groups. The stratified differences of average spreads in military, education, and 
culture sectors over environment are bigger than the gaps of optimal alpha levels 
among sectors. This result indicates the investors required higher excess spreads in 
education and culture sectors than environment, implicitly recognizing additional 
idiosyncratic risks. From the above test results we can draw several policy 
implications for further improvement of PPP system: rigorous ex-ante project 
assessment, inducement of market competition, proper private partner selection, and 
optimal risk sharing. 
(1) Rigorous project assessment 
   PPP should be used to enlarge financing space for government, meaning it 
should be able to save tax payers money by securing value-for-money (Vfm). The 
Vfm can be obtained only when a life-cycle cost of PPP option is cheaper than a 
traditional public procurement, while maintaining same quality of service. To 
46) the average bid-ratio of military group is 1.71, that of education is 2.10 and that of culture is 2.02
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achieve this goal, quantitative assessment is needed to compare the government’s 
burden in a professional and independent way. Korean government has been 
trying to control average BTL return within Nationally affordable level. From the 
legislation of BTL in 2005, ex-ante project assessment is mandated to secure 
value-for-money (Vfm). The 6% of discount rate is used in the Vfm test 
currently. The discount rate is one of the most important factors that determines 
Vfm. Other conditions being equal, if the discount rate increases, Vfm increases 
because the present value of government’s future liability from BTL contract 
becomes lower. As the discount rate is higher than the optimal level, some of the 
projects lack of Vfm may have passed and exploit excess returns. Based on the 
study result, optimal level of average BTL return reflecting systematic risk is 
around 5.4% ~ 5.8%. As the current 6% of discount rate is higher than the 
optimal level, it had better be lowered. As a result, it may be suggested that a 
rigorous ax-ante project assessment with lower level of hurdle rate can contribute 
to affordable average of alpha in the National level, eventually resulting in public 
benefit. However, at the same time, bankable level of project return should be 
granted to invite numbers of willingness investors to PPP. 
(2) Market competition and maturity   
   Promoting a market competition is one of the most important factors for the 
successful implementation of PPP. As was proved by the empirical analysis result, 
the bid ratio has significant impact on the level of risk spread (alpha). At the 
same time, it is revealed that the degree of market maturity (project experience) 
also affects on the level of risk spread. It is a good empirical evidence that the 
enhanced market maturity or competition can contribute to public good by 
decreasing required rate of return of private investors. By decreasing alpha spread, 
government's payment burden can be reduced. As a result, it is concluded that 
promoting voluntary decrease of alpha through market competition will be one of 
the most desirable goal for public policy. 
   Several policy means may be considered to increase the degree of market 
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competition. First of all, transparent public information release may contribute to 
the vitalized market competition. As was discussed, PPP information is not well 
published. There probably exists considerable information asymmetry between 
public and private, as well as among private investors, which fact defers market 
competition. Not a few cases, wilful investors may not be able to join a suitable 
project due to a lack of project information. Enhanced system of public hearings 
or public opinion collection process during project planning may be considered as 
one of examples for project information sharing. 
    Together with information transparency, simplifying and shortening the PPP 
procedure can be a second policy means for the market promotion. Typically, PPP 
projects need long preparation time, which can't be endured by middle or small 
cap investors. As is shown from empirical analysis result, there is no statistical 
evidence that project preparation period significantly influenced on the average 
contract alpha. It means the reduction of project preparation period through 
simplifying process and inviting efficiency can motivate broader range of private 
investment to join PPP without increasing average risk spread, alpha. 
   Additionally, there exist another indirect benefit from vitalized market 
competition. As is discussed in the empirical analysis, the correlation coefficient 
of debt funding cost spread (kd_spread) shows 0.187, which is one of the 
strongest exogenous variables. It is concluded that, if other conditions being equal 
and the debt funding cost spread (kd_spread) increases 1%p, the average alpha 
increases 0.187%p under 99% of confidence. The debt funding cost is determined 
by supply and demand of finance market. The fund demand is determined by 
accumulative value of PPP projects, while the fund supply is determined by 
number of willing financial institutions. If PPP market is vitalized and bigger 
number of financial investors look for investment opportunity, the supply curve of 
project financing (PF) market will shift to right, resulting in decreased funding 
cost in overall. The decreased funding cost can lower required BTL project return 
(alpha), resulting in fiscal budget savings. 
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(3) Proper partner selection and risk sharing     
    Another important policy implication may be selecting capable partner and 
optimally sharing risks to decrease total project risk. The lowered total risk level 
can directly impact on the required rate of return, and eventually on the 
government’s budget. As is discussed, the optimal risk spread (alpha) level is 
determined mainly based on the amount of construction and operation risk. The 
detail meaning of 'risk' in this context is the 'forecasted' and at the same time, 
'expected to be controlled'. Both procuring authority and private investor will 
forecast degree of risk when negotiating the level of alpha. During negotiation, 
the risk level is forecasted assuming it be allocated among procuring government 
and private equity-holders. Here arise two important issues: how much capable the 
project partners enough to manage allocated risks by providing experience and 
knowledge in their assigned roles, and how optimally the roles and risks are 
allocated to parties who can best handle. It means, even with same project, 
numerous cases of risk allocation can be made, and the total sum of allocated 
ex-post risk will be different depending on the quality of participants and risk 
sharing structures. This issue is closely related with the core rationale of PPP: 
even though the original project risk does not change, by properly allocating 
project risk to capable parties and by inviting private efficiency, the ex-post 
controlled risk can be reduced. On the basis of risk-return profile, if total risk 
reduced, required rate of return (or risk spread) shall decrease, too.
   On the basis of empirical analysis, it is revealed that the stratified gaps of 
average contract alpha over environment sector are bigger than the differences of 
optimal levels among sectors. This result indicates the investors require 
comparatively higher excess returns in education and culture sectors than 
environment, implicitly recognizing additional idiosyncratic factors. But, if capable 
partners are selected and risks are allocated in better way, both construction and 
operation risks in ex-post basis may have decrease. And the lowered risk level 
can directly impact on the required risk spread of private investors. Recognizing 
the lower level of risk, private investors will probably agree decreasing project 
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alpha in negotiation. It may be achieved as number of projects accumulate and 
more experienced partners join PPP market. In summary, by selecting capable 
partners and sharing risk optimally, project return can be lowered without harming 
the possibility of funding, and eventually, government budget can be saved.  
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VII. Conclusion 
   'The Promotion of Private Capital into Social Overhead Capital Investment 
Act' was legislated in August 1994 as a way of supplementing government 
finances in Korea. Since then, the use of PPP has contributed to the rapid 
economic growth. As a result, Korea had total 435 BTL projects, which value 
amounted about $24.77 billion as of 2013. The importance of BTL has been 
increasing due to the socio-economic trend. However, as the number of PPP 
projects accumulates, public criticism that private investors exploit too high profit 
from infrastructure is also increasing. Besides, most of researches commonly 
argue that infrastructure markets are inefficient and so, considerable level of 
excess returns exist for various reasons. 
   On the basis of the hypothesis test, it is found that the average contract risk 
spread (alpha) of BTL in Korea is higher than that of optimal level: the average 
contract alpha of environment sector is 0.17%p, military is 0.24%p, education is 
0.26%p, and that of culture sector is 0.35%p higher than the optimal level of 
alpha. And it is concluded that there is no evidence BTL market of Korea is 
efficient47) in all sectors. To reduce the gap between the contract average and 
optimal level of alpha, more rigorous project assessment, using lower level of 
hurdle rate, is suggested as one of the policy implications. From the 
commencement of BTL in 2005, the value-for-money (Vfm) test has been 
performed, and currently 6% of discount rate is being used as a hurdle rate in 
the test. Based on the study result, optimal level of BTL return is estimated 
around 5.4% ~ 5.8%, considering systematic risk. As this rate is higher than the 
47) However, it should be mentioned that the higher level of contract alpha than optimal level does not necessarily mean a mispricing because there exist considerable level of idiosyncratic factors that can not be removed through diversification in real world, especially in infrastructure market.
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optimal level, some of the projects may have exploited excess return, although 
not substantial.  
   Empirical analysis is additionally performed to understand what idiosyncratic 
factors influence how much impact on BTL risk spread, using OLS (Ordinary 
Least Squares). The result provides supporting evidence of the different levels of 
idiosyncratic factors among facility sectors. The funding cost spread is proved to 
have the strongest impact on the average contract alpha. The lowest average 
funding cost of environment sector contributed to forming comparatively low 
contract alpha, while that of culture sector is high due to higher funding cost. It 
is also found that the average contract alpha has negative correlation with bid 
ratio. The average contract alpha of environment sector is supposed to be formed 
in lower level than other sectors due to the highest average bid ratio, which is 
2.27048). It is observed the culture sector has the lowest maturity than other 
groups49), which fact may have contributed to the highest level of deviation of 
average contract alpha from the optimal level. 
   The empirical analysis reveals, regardless of the statistical confidence level, a 
project size does not have meaningful influence on the contract risk spread 
(alpha). This result suggests BTL investors do not require increased marginal 
return for bigger investment size. Or most of BTL projects are small sized and 
thus, the difference of investment sizes among projects are not significant. So, 
the marginal impact of investment size to alpha may have been limited. This 
finding also explains why bundling of BTL projects such as schools or 
dormitories are popular and efficient. 
   It is found that the stratified gaps of average alpha in, education, and culture 
sectors over environment based on empirical analysis are bigger than the gaps of 
48) the average bid-ratio of military group is 1.71, that of education is 2.10 and that of culture is 2.02
49) Total population of culture group is only 42, which is far smaller than other groups: 96 in environment, 70 in military, and 218 in education.  
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optimal levels among sectors. Additional analysis is performed to compare the 
degree of alpha deviation from the regression line (model 3) in respective 
sectors. This result shows that investors in education and culture sectors requires 
higher excess returns implicitly recognizing additional idiosyncratic risks.  
   The risk free rate (rf) and credit spread (aa_rf) variables are included in 
regression models for the control purpose. Anyway, from the coefficients of 
these two variables, it is found that the total return of BTL has some degree of 
rigidity against the change of both market rates. It implies that investors look 
for a long-term spread and thus, temporary decrease of market rate makes them 
require higher alpha in some degree to secure the total investment return over 
investable level, and vice versa when market rate increases. 
   Several PPP policies are suggested to achieve Nationally affordable level of 
BTL returns and thus, secure public benefit. As is discussed, more rigorous 
project assessment, using lower level of hurdle rate (lower than the current 6% 
of rate) is proposed as the first policy implication. As is proved from the 
analysis, the degree of market maturity or competition contributes to public good 
by decreasing required rate of return for private investors. By decreasing alpha 
spread, government's payment burden can be reduced. As a result, promoting 
voluntary decrease of alpha spread through market competition is another policy 
suggestion. The other policy implication is to select capable partner and 
optimally share project risk. The lowered risk level through proper risk sharing 
among capable partners can directly impact on the level of alpha, and eventually 
can save government’s budget. 
   The research topic covered the optimal risk spread and idiosyncratic factors 
to draw policy implications. However, there remains further improvement points. 
This research measured operation risk depending on cross-sectional approach 
- 83 -
because there is not enough time-series operation data of BTL projects. As time 
goes on, the financial data in operation phase will be accumulated and thus, the 
operation risk can be measured directly from respective SPC. Second, if data 
allows, it would be interesting to apply the framework of this paper to other 
economies (foreign markets) to compare the test results and degree of impacts 
by idiosyncratic factors.
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APPENDIX 
(1) Construction sponsor data statistics for beta calculation 
(source : KIS line, Public and Private Investment Management Center)
(2) Equality test among estimated betas 
Statistics
The hypothesis
    
 




    
Z( =0.005)α  = ±2.58,   Z( =0.025)α  = ±1.96,   Z( =0.05)α  = ±1.65 
Group Number of project
Number of
construction 
sponsors 
Outlier Number of sample Selection ratio
Environment 96 126 14 112 88.89%
Military 70 79 4 75 94.94%
Education 218 185 7 178 96.22%
Culture 42 68 6 62 91.18%
Total 426 458 31 427 93.23%
Statistics average  (in all BTL) env mil edu cult
E(β) 1.143 1.158  1.288  1.177  1.102  
SD(β) 0.156 0.285  0.474  0.259  0.247  
N 6,042 1,600  1,041  2,521  895  
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Z-test and conclusion 
(3) Calculation of risk free rate and long-term investment risk premium
 
(4) Calculation of market return 
   There may be various ways of measuring market return depending on measurement period or 
asset coverage. This paper assumes the weighted average return on equity of all audited companies 
in Korea comprises local market return. Return on equity is selected because the estimated market 
Rf_5years Rf_20years long-short spread (20-5)
2005-12-30 5.36% N/A N/A
2006-12-29 5.00% 5.19% 0.19%
2007-12-31 5.78% 5.67% -0.11%
2008-12-31 3.77% 4.60% 0.83%
2009-12-31 4.92% 5.61% 0.69%
2010-12-31 4.08% 4.68% 0.60%
2011-12-30 3.46% 4.01% 0.55%
2012-12-31 2.97% 3.28% 0.31%
2013-12-31 3.23% 3.77% 0.54%
2014-12-31 2.28% 2.80% 0.52%
 Average 0.457%
X1 = βa = 1.144 X1 = βa = 1.144 X1 = βa = 1.144 X1 = βa = 1.144
X2 = βenv = 1.158 X2 = βmil = 1.288 X2 = βedu = 1.177 X2 = βcult = 1.102
Z-value -2.03 -9.78 -6.14 4.83
decision  - 2.58 < Z < -1.96 Z < -2.58 Z < -2.58 Z > 2.58
conclusion
X1 is different from X2
(95% confidence)
X1 is different from X2
(99% confidence)
X1 is different from X2
(99% confidence)
X1 is different from X2
(99% confidence)
Ho is rejected 
under 95%
Ho is rejected 
under 99%
Ho is rejected 
under 99%
Ho is rejected 
under 99%
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return will be used as a benchmark to BTL return on equity. And when market return is 
estimated from financial market, the return on stock (equity) is generally considered as a market 
return, which is consistent with accounting return on equity. 
   The net profit and equity amount data of all audited companies in Korea from 2000 to 2014 　
are collected. The return on equity of each company at time 't' are calculated by dividing profit 
with equity. All of the return on equity at time 't' are averaged by the weight of equity amount. 
  
 

  × 
  

 



        ′′
          ′′
 
 
The result of market returns are summarized as below table: 
Year Number of companies(audited in Korea)  R(m)t
FY 2000 11,255 3.86%
FY 2001 12,272 3.28%
FY 2002 13,325 8.84%
FY 2003 14,039 9.99%
FY 2004 14,597 14.38%
FY 2005 15,232 12.20%
FY 2006 16,172 10.30%
FY 2007 17,119 10.31%
FY 2008 17,985 4.72%
FY 2009 18,786 7.81%
FY 2010 19,877 10.07%
FY 2011 21,002 6.83%
FY 2012 22,124 5.94%
FY 2013 22,759 4.34%
FY 2014 21,262 5.19%
average 7.87%
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(5) SPC selection data statistics for NOI estimation△  
 
  Samples are selected when a project meets both criteria of operation status and showing positive 
NOI. Which means it is assumed that rational investors will forecast NOI based on operating 
projects that have normal, positive NOI. The sample selection ratio to available population is 78% 
in average (71% in environment, 92% in military, 75% in education, and 87% in culture facility)  
(6) Calculation of risk spread in operation (rs*ot) period using coupon spread (0cst)
 
  The risk spread calculated by time weighted average of coupon spread is compared with other 
result calculated using internal rate of return (IRR). In the below example, it is assumed that a 
$500 of bond is comprised of 5 separate coupons with same amount ($100) and scheduled to 
mature at every year. The cash flows from t=0 to t=5 are summarized in 'total CF' and the 
internal rate of return (IRR) is calculated. 
   In the right side, the time weighted average of coupon spread is calculated based on the 
below formula. The result is slightly different by 0.0002%, which seems reasonably waved. The 
risk spread in operation period is estimated by approximation with below formula.  
 





  

 × 
environment military education culture Total
Population  
(In operation & available data exist) 69 51 185 30 335
number of samples for regression 49 47 139 26 261
% of selected samples 71% 92% 75% 87% 78%
- 92 -
(7) Zero mean equality test on expected asset value volatility
- Statistics
- The hypothesis 
   ≠ 
 

 
  
Statistics env mil edu cult
 
∆   0.0001958 -0.0006510 -0.0002595 0.0028926
 
∆   0.00586 0.00762 0.01142 0.01411
N 49 47 139 26
coupon rate 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year t * coupon rate
Coupon 1 0.800% 0.80 0.80%
Coupon 2 0.600% 0.60 0.60 1.20%
Coupon 3 0.050% 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.15%
Coupon 4 0.030% 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.12%
Coupon 5 0.020% 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.10%
Interest income 1.50 0.70 0.10 0.05 0.02 2.37%
Principle payment 500 100 100 100 100 100

 
  t = 15
Total CF -500 101.5 100.7 100.1 100.05 100.02
r = 2.37% / 15
IRR  = 0.1582%  = 0.1580%
(Example) comparison of results between time weighted average and IRR approach  
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- t-test and conclusion 
(8) ratio derivation ϴ 
   Financial theories generally state that next year's forward rate can be measured based on 2 and 
1 year's spot rates, using geometric mean formula as below: 
       ∙     
Applying the same logic, the optimal life-cycle return of BTL can be expressed with a share of return 
for construction period, that for operation period, and a long-term risk spread as below: 
       ×    
 
 m  : total project contract term 
 n   : construction term 
 m-n : operation term    
And the optimal return of BTL is defined as follows: 　
   ∙     ∙  
r*t  : optimal return from a BTL project assessed at time 't' (beginning of project) 
r*c,t : optimal return during construction period from a BTL project
r*o,t : optimal rerun during operation period from a BTL project
: share of return for construction period in total ϴ  
   If we get the solutions of all the exogenous variables except , combining the 2 formula, we canϴ 　
express as below: ϴ 
environment military education culture
t-value (calculated) 0.23 -0.58 -0.27 1.03
d.f 48 46 138 25
 tdf(99%) ±2.94 ±2.95 ±2.85 ±3.08
conclusion
No evidence E(X) is  
different from zero 
(99% confidence)
No evidence E(X) is  
different from zero 
(99% confidence)
No evidence E(X) is  
different from zero 
(99% confidence)
No evidence E(X) is  
different from zero 
(99% confidence)
Ho is rejected 
under 99%
Ho is rejected 
under 99%
Ho is rejected 
under 99%
Ho is rejected 
under 99%
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 ∙    ∙        ×   
 
 ∙             ×   
 
 ∙              ×     
 
   
   ×   
  

   
(9) Empirical test without risk free rate variable  
  Standard errors in parentheses
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(10) The original expression of Merton model and application 
   The formula (4.11) in the paper is drawn based on the put option pricing formula 
expression of Black-Scholes because it is more familiar to practitioners. Even though the 
concept of option theory is similar, there is a technical difference in expressing cumulative 
 (1) (2) (3)VARIABLES alpha alpha alpha    aa_rf -0.0523*** -0.0532*** -0.0516*** (0.0133) (0.0132) (0.0132)kd_spread 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.199*** (0.0279) (0.0277) (0.0278)invest_size -0.0385** -0.0357** -0.0619*** (0.0182) (0.0177) (0.0154)sub_binom 0.0268    (0.0414)   bid_ratio -0.0239** -0.0225** -0.0250** (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0105)authority -0.0522    (0.0427)   period -5.97e-05    (6.72e-05)   milit 0.0492 0.0932***   (0.0539) (0.0348)  edu 0.0601* 0.0763***   (0.0306) (0.0282)  cult 0.193*** 0.192***   (0.0431) (0.0398)  Constant 1.390*** 1.284*** 1.609*** (0.223) (0.206) (0.177)    Observations 329 329 329R-squared 0.330 0.325 0.273
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probability between Morton and Black-Scholes. The Black-Scholes does not consider the value 
of interest payment at maturity because the underlying asset is a stock, while the Merton 
model considers the payment of interest at maturity because the underlying asset is a bond. 
   The d1 is expressed as   
Ln    in Black Scholes assuming – t=0, 
and if we consider additional interest payment at maturity, it will be changed as 
  
Ln   . 
Whereas, the original Merton model expresses   

   ln   (Where, d= L/Vt). 
Which can be transformed as follows:  
 
 
 
   ln 


 
   ln  
 
  
ln
   
 
   

ln   
 

 
As a result, the h1 in Merton model can be expressed as (-)d1 when the term of 
Black-Scholes is applied as is in the formula (4.11). 
   Anyway, for the calculation purpose, the original form of Merton model is used in the 
paper. The original form of Merton model is expressed as below: 
  
 ln   
 
  

   ln 
  

   ln 
  
Ʈ the length of time remaining to loan maturity 　＝ 
d  = the firm’s (borrower’s) leverage ratio measured as 
 , where the market value 
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of debt is valued at rate ‘r’, the risk free rate of interest 
N(h) = a value computed from the standardized normal distribution statistical tables. This 
value reflects the probability that a deviation exceeding the calculated value of h will 
occur. 
